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Theory of mind is an important aspect of social understanding and the development of 
this skill is of much interest. Theory of mind describes the ability to infer the mental states of 
others and apply this knowledge. Despite significant research into the roles that related 
constructs such as language and emotion understanding play in theory-of-mind development, 
the construct of empathy has received little attention. It is of interest to look at the association 
between empathy and theory of mind, in the context of known social correlates such as parent 
mental state talk. This longitudinal study aimed to investigate the relation between empathy 
and theory of mind, and to determine whether it was mediated by parent mental state talk.  
The current study involved 55 children and their parents. These children were 
involved in a previous study by Aitken (2019) when they had an average age of 20.5 months. 
Aitken’s study assessed child prosociality, self-concept, empathy, and language ability, and 
parent’s use of mental state talk. The current study saw these children again when they were 
4.6 years on average. Child false-belief understanding, empathy, emotion understanding, 
prosociality, and language ability was assessed, and parents’ mental state talk was assessed 
again.  
Correlation and mediation analyses revealed three main findings. First, early empathy 
was not related to later theory of mind, second, empathy and theory of mind were not 
associated at age 4.6, and third, both empathy and theory of mind were associated with parent 
mental state talk at the later time point. Additionally, results showed that children’s later 
prosociality mediated the association between parents’ early references to child emotions and 
later child emotion understanding. Furthermore, within the later time point, the association 
between parents’ references to child cognitions and child false-belief understanding, was 
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The Role of Empathy and Mental State Talk in Theory-of Mind-Development: A 
Longitudinal Investigation 
The development of theory of mind is a key process that occurs during the formative 
years of a child’s life. Theory of mind describes the ability to understand that one’s own 
mental states, including desires, emotions, intentions and beliefs are different from those of 
others. Furthermore, it encompasses the understanding that mental states can reflect reality, 
but that they are distinct from real-world events. Premack and Woodruff (1978) defined 
theory of mind as one’s ability to impute mental states to the self and others, and to predict 
the behaviours of others based on these states. They defined this as a theory because the 
process of imputing mental states requires inferences to be made about non-observable 
phenomena.   
A child’s theory of mind develops over the preschool years. During this time, children 
gain an understanding of multiple concepts, and pass a series of developmental milestones 
(Wellman, 2002). One of these milestones is the passing of false-belief tasks, which tends to 
occur at around four or five years of age (Wellman et al., 2001). A significant amount of 
research has investigated theory-of-mind development over the last few decades. While a 
consensus seems to have been reached as to the general timeline of this development, 
uncertainty remains over which factors drive this development, and to what degree. Factors 
that have been found to contribute to variance in theory-of-mind development include early 
language abilities, emotion understanding, parent mental state talk, socioeconomic status 
(SES), and having siblings (Astington & Baird, 2005; Carpendale & Lewis, 2004; 
Drummond et al., 2014; Howard et al., 2008; Lane et al., 2010; Milligan et al., 2007).  
Theory-of-Mind Development 
A number of broad learning theories have been proposed to account for the 
development of theory of mind. One of the earliest theories that sought to explain this 
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development, was Piaget’s (1954) constructivist theory. Piaget believed that humans hold 
coherent, abstract and highly structured representations of others’ minds. He posited that 
children’s representations of others’ perspectives develop gradually, eventually cumulating in 
a shift from thinking egocentrically, to thinking about the thoughts and intentions of others, 
starting between 5- and 7-years-old (Piaget, 1972). While Piaget’s theory provided a basis for 
several later theories, it was criticised for being developmentally inaccurate, as subsequent 
research indicated that the shift in awareness actually takes place between 4- and 6-years-old 
(Perner et al., 1987). Furthermore, Piaget’s theory has been criticised for failing to 
sufficiently account for social influences (Carpendale & Lewis, 2006). 
Today the majority of theories are centred around two positions: nativism and 
empiricism (Wellman, 2014). Nativism supports the existence of highly structured, abstract, 
coherent representations, but it denies that they can be learned. Instead it is believed that such 
representations are innate (Leslie, 1994). This view has received much criticism in light of 
accumulating evidence which suggests that the quality and quantity of a child’s early social 
experiences are closely related to their theory-of-mind development (Carpendale & Lewis, 
2004; Ensor & Hughes, 2008; Hughes et al., 2018; Perner et al., 1994; Ruffman et al., 1998; 
Ruffman et al., 2002) 
Empirically based theories are markedly different from nativist theories in that they 
see all knowledge and development as coming from experiences, rather than innate abilities 
(Wellman, 2014). A child’s experiences are thought to accumulate over time, and inform 
their future behaviours and perceptions. Accordingly, the development of an understanding of 
others’ mental states occurs as children gain social experience, and accumulate social 
information. While the importance of social interactions is more prominent than in nativist 
theories, some have argued that many empirical perspectives are still too individualistic, and 
fail to sufficiently emphasise the role of social influences (Hobson, 1991; Reddy, 1991). 
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Hobson argues that rather than infants holding a ‘theory’ of mind per se, their knowledge of 
others’ minds is acquired through their social interactions. He states that infants are born with 
the capacity to relate to others, and through using this ability they develop an understanding 
of the nature of others’ minds (Hobson, 1991).  
Social learning theories see a child’s interactions with others as the driving force 
behind the development of their understanding of other people’s mental states. Early thinking 
in this area came from Vygotsky (1978). Vygotsky argued that mental functions often occur 
between the child and another person (inter psychic plane) before the child demonstrates the 
mental function alone (intra psychic plane). This means a child will develop and demonstrate 
a certain skill for the first time during a social interaction. This skill will then be internalised 
and the child will be able to use it independently. 
Continued interest in social learning theories resulted in the emergence of several 
different pathways that aimed to explain how social interaction facilitates theory-of-mind 
development. Reddy (1991) argued that theory of mind develops from a very young age, 
noting that prior to age 4, children are able to tease others and tell lies, thus demonstrating 
that they hold some level of understanding of how mental states can differ between people. 
She argues that this understanding comes from rich sequences of adult-infant interactions, 
such as playful teasing. Hobson (1991) also placed much importance on the role of adult-
infant interactions, arguing that shared attention to objects, and shared affective engagement 
between infants and others, forms the basis of social understanding. Several theorists have 
proposed the existence of a triangular framework which joins the child, the other, and the 
object (Carpendale & Lewis, 2004; Chapman, 1991; Hobson, 1991). This allows children to 
perceive the attitudes and behaviours of the other in response to the object, which they can 




Progression of Theory of Mind  
Theory-of-mind development is an ongoing process that occurs throughout the 
lifespan. It is characterised by a series of accomplishments in mental state understanding 
(Wellman, 2002). There is now a well-documented developmental sequence to these 
accomplishments. In one of the first studies to track this developmental process, Wellman 
and Liu (2004) demonstrated that children first develop an understanding of diverse desires, 
meaning they realise that other people’s beliefs may differ to their own. This is followed by 
an understanding of diverse beliefs, and later, an understanding of false beliefs. This means 
children can understand that two people can have different beliefs if they themselves do not 
know which belief is correct, before they can understand that people’s beliefs may differ, 
even if they themselves know which belief is correct. In line with the taxonomy of 
developmental sequences from Flavell (1972), Wellman and Liu concluded that each 
developmental accomplishment is dependent on those before it, with each serving to modify 
or mediate existing understanding.  
There are several key experimental paradigms that allow for each stage of theory of 
mind development to be assessed. False-belief tasks assess a child’s ability to represent the 
definite belief of another, even when this differs from what the child knows to be true. 
Passing these tasks means that the child has correctly identified the belief of another person, 
despite knowing that the person is mistaken (Perner et al., 1987). Meta-analyses have shown 
that despite differences between false-belief tasks, the age at which children pass them tends 
be between 4- and 6-years-old, although factors, such as language abilities, and culture do 
cause some variation (Dixson et al., 2017; Wellman et al., 2001; Wimmer & Perner, 1983).  
Wimmer and Perner (1983) found that failure to pass false-belief tasks among 4- to 6-
year-olds, cannot be attributed to difficulty remembering the task details, or to low central 
processing capacity. They concluded that from 4-years-old, children who fail false-belief 
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tasks do so because they are incapable of holding alternative models: one of what is truly 
happening, and another that is incompatible with this reality. Others have opposed this view. 
Wellman and Estes (1986) showed that 3-year-old children tend to have near perfect 
understandings of how real and imaginary objects differ, suggesting that they can hold 
alternative models of what is real and what is not. This was supported by studies of pretend 
play, in which children were shown to be capable of representing alternative models of reality 
from 1.5-years-old (Bretherton, 1984). Perner et al. (1987) concluded that while these 
children are capable of representing alternative models and recognising the truth values of 
these models, they are not yet able to assign conflicting truth values to models. Therefore, 
when presented with a classic false-belief paradigm, they cannot represent the mistaken belief 
of another, despite being able to differentiate from real and imaginary events when both are 
seen from their own perspective. 
Language Abilities 
Language is seen as a particularly important component of theory-of-mind 
development. While some see conversation as a means of exposing children to the 
perspectives of other people, others argue that language allows children to acquire mental 
state terms (Astington, 2001; Harris, 1996). Another perspective posits that children learn the 
meaning of mental state terms by learning how they are used across various contexts 
(Carpendale & Lewis, 2004; Turnbull & Carpendale, 1999). 
Research has shown performance on measures of language knowledge and of use of 
language structures, to be predictive of theory-of-mind development (Astington & Baird, 
2005; Milligan et al., 2007). In a meta-analytic study, Milligan et al. (2007) concluded that a 
significant, moderate relation exists between children’s linguistic abilities and their theory of 
mind, independent of age. Upon analysis of different aspects of language, they found general 
language, semantics, receptive vocabulary, syntax, and memory for complements, to be 
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significantly related to false-belief task performance. Early general language measures which 
comprised a combination of semantic and syntactic items were found to have the strongest 
relations. Semantic abilities require word knowledge and word meaning. It is thought that 
children learn words, but do not understand their meaning until the words are used in context 
in social interactions. Hearing and using terms such as those describing mental states, may 
help children to understand their meaning and to connect this meaning with their own mental 
states. In contrast, syntactic abilities reflect a child’s mastery of linguistic structures. This 
refers to how well a child can combine words to form a sentence. It has been proposed that 
children’s exposure to, and use of, sentential complements provides them with a format in 
which they can represent false beliefs (De Villiers & Pyers, 2002). Receptive vocabulary 
refers to the vocabulary that is understood by a child. Milligan et al. found this to be 
correlated least strongly with theory of mind, although they suggested that this may be due to 
it being the most pure measure of language ability. Receptive vocabulary knowledge may 
therefore be necessary, but not sufficient for passing false-belief tasks.  
Pragmatics measures, which assess the ability to use language in a social interaction, 
have also been shown to be related to theory of mind (Astington & Baird, 2005). Pragmatic 
abilities are influenced by the child’s social environment. Cutting and Dunn (1999) found 
pragmatic measures of language, which assessed the content, coherence, and complexity of a 
story told by a child, to be related to false-belief task performance. Another measure of 
pragmatic abilities is the connectedness of communication, which refers to how well a child’s 
speech is connected to that of their conversational partner (Dunn & Brophy, 2005). 
Slomkowski and Dunn (1996) investigated the conversational connectedness of 40-month-
olds with their friends, and found it was indicative of their performance on theory-of-mind 
tasks. Pragmatics are thought to be linked to theory-of-mind development, as pragmatic 
abilties allow one to track the beliefs and intentions of another.  
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The direction of the relationship between false-belief task performance and language 
is a topic of much interest. Understanding this provides insight into the developmental 
pathway that leads to a child’s theory of mind. It has been hypothesised that language 
influences theory of mind, that theory of mind influences language, and that they influence 
each other (Cutting & Dunn, 1999). Another possibility, is that the linguistic complexity of 
theory-of-mind tasks can account for the correlations between language ability and theory of 
mind. However, the correlation tends to remain stable on less linguistically demanding 
measures of theory of mind, so linguistic complexity is unlikely to provide a complete 
account of the correlation (Cutting & Dunn, 1999; Milligan et al., 2007). Milligan et al. found 
a bidirectional relationship between language ability and false-belief understanding, however 
the direction of effect was found to be significantly stronger from language ability to false-
belief understanding than in the reverse direction. This finding supported earlier findings 
from longitudinal studies which found language to be predictive of false-belief performance 
(Astington & Jenkins, 1999; De Villiers & Pyers, 2002; Ruffman et al., 2003). 
Ruffman (2014) argued that children’s language ability contributed to later theory of 
mind in three key ways. First, language provides children with frequent frames that help them 
to infer the meaning of unknown words. If a child hears a sentence with one unknown word 
in it, for example a mental state term, their understanding of the other words helps them to 
infer the meaning of the unknown word. Second, language enables children to understand 
other people’s statements about their own mental states. If a child has the linguistic 
capabilities to understand the meaning of others’ speech they are better able to understand 
when someone expresses having a mental state that differs to that of the child. This 
experience informs their understanding that mental states differ between people. Last, 
understanding nuances in language allows children to distinguish between different mental 
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states. Ruffman gave the example of “thinking that” and “thinking of”, where the former 
refers to belief, and the latter to imagination.  
Self-Concept 
Another important factor in the development of theory of mind is self-concept 
(Ruffman, 2014). Self-concept describes the understanding of the self as a separate entity to 
others and allows an individual to understand that their own mental states differ from those of 
others (Moore, 2007). While there is some debate surrounding when self-concept emerges, 
the general consensus is that it is evident from around 18 months. This is typically when 
children begin to recognise their own physical appearance, as demonstrated in the mirror self-
recognition task (Amsterdam, 1972; Courage et al., 2004; Nielsen et al., 2006). The mirror 
self-recognition task sees a mark surreptitiously placed on a child’s face where they cannot 
see it directly. They are then placed in front of a mirror and their reaction to their reflection is 
observed. Prior to 18 months, children tend to ignore the mark, while older children 
investigate the mark, ‘passing’ the task. This recognition of physical appearance suggests the 
presence of a mental model of the physical self (Nielsen et al., 2006).  
Another indication of a child’s self-concept is their correct use and understanding of 
personal pronouns such as “mine” (Hay, 2006; Lewis & Brooks-Gunn, 1979; Meissner, 2008; 
Stipek et al., 1990). Because the referent of personal pronouns shifts depending on who is 
speaking and to whom, an understanding of point-of-view is necessary in order to make the 
correct inferences (Ricard et al., 1999). For example, a child must understand that when they 
say “mine” they indicate their possession of an object, but if their mother says “mine” she is 
indicating that she possesses the object. Stipek et al. found the concept of the physical self to 
be a prerequisite to correctly using and understanding personal pronouns.  
As the self-concept develops, so does a child’s other-awareness. This describes the 
notion that children possess an ‘image of other’ in addition to an ‘image of self’. For 
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example, as a child’s empathy develops, we see them transition from emotion contagion, 
where they share the emotions of others, to ‘egocentric empathy’, where they see others’ 
emotional states as distinct from their own. As self-concept and other awareness develop, 
children gain the ability to represent their image of self, in relation to other people. They have 
the capacity to evaluate their appearance and actions in terms of both their own and others’ 
standards, allowing for the experience of emotions such as embarrassment, shame, and pride, 
and emotional reactions to transgressions (Kagan, 2013; Lewis et al., 1989).  
The development of self-concept has been shown to be linked to the development of 
important markers of social understanding. Ricard et al. (1999) for example, found that visual 
perspective taking, the ability to judge what others can or cannot see, was related to and 
preceded children’s mastery of personal pronouns. Lewis and Ramsay (2004) found self-
recognition and personal pronoun use to be related to children’s participation in pretend play 
with others. These findings suggest that a child’s self-concept is related to their early 
understanding of differing perspectives and their ability to distinguish between pretense and 
reality. 
One useful measure of a child’s self-concept is the UCLA Self-Understanding 
Questionnaire (SUQ) (Stipek et al., 1990). This parent-report questionnaire measures four 
dimensions of self-concept: self-description and evaluation, self-recognition, emotional 
responses to wrongdoing, and autonomy. While the SUQ does not correlate with the mirror 
recognition task (Taumoepeau & Reese, 2014), positive correlations between it and measures 
of empathic concern and helping during helping tasks have been found (Nichols et al., 2009), 
indicating that it does successfully measure children’s understanding of the self and the other, 




Demonstrating a theory of mind not only requires self-concept and other-awareness, 
but also a knowledge and understanding of emotions. For example, to understand that people 
having diverse desires and pass diverse desire tasks, a child must understand the emotional 
consequences of each outcome. If they are told a character likes broccoli, but does not like 
cookies, they need to be able to connect these preferences with emotions, and understand that 
if the character is presented with a cookie, they will be sad. Such desire tasks tend to be 
passed by children aged 3-years and older. Emotion understanding appears to be important in 
facilitating the passing of these tasks, and may serve as a base on which further mental state 
understanding is built (Ruffman et al., 2002; Wellman & Liu, 2004). 
Emotion understanding describes the ability to predict and identify others’ emotions 
and to appreciate that emotions can be overtly, and privately experienced, and has been 
shown to improve with age (Denham et al., 1994; Pons et al., 2004). Knowing terms for 
different emotions, recognising the facial expressions, and understanding elicitors of 
emotions are important in emotion understanding (Eggum et al., 2011).  
Pons et al. (2004) provide a timeline of the development of emotion understanding in 
children. They state that from 3- to 4-years-old children recognise and label basic emotions 
based on expressive cues, and understand that external cues influence others’ emotions. From 
4- to 6-years, children begin to connect people’s emotional reactions with their beliefs, and to 
understand how outward expressions can differ from internal experiences. Emerging by 5-
years is an appreciation of the influence of desires on emotional reactions. From 6-years-old 
children begin to understand that emotions can decrease in intensity with time, but may be 
reactivated by certain situations. The final stages of development are said to occur at around 
8-years, and give children an understanding of mixed emotions, and morality. There is 
significant variability in when children reach each of these stages. Factors that have been 
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shown to influence emotion understanding development include the number of mental state 
terms used by family members in conversation, the quality of mother-sibling interaction, and 
SES (Dunn et al., 1991). While gender is often controlled for in studies of emotion 
understanding, most studies have found it had no effect (Dunn et al., 1991; Ornaghi et al., 
2016; Pons et al., 2004), although Kårstad et al. (2015) found it made a small contribution.  
The Relation between Emotion Understanding and Theory of Mind.  
A significant amount of research has been dedicated to investigating whether theory-
of-mind development is linked to the development of emotion understanding, and if so, how. 
While the development of theory of mind and emotional understanding are initially two 
relatively separate processes, some have argued that the two become intertwined as the child 
matures, and increasingly mature social demands and cognitions are required (Lane et al., 
2010). The understanding of hidden emotion for example, requires a child to understand that 
a person’s outward expression differs from their internal affective state (Harris et al., 1986). 
Three main hypotheses have emerged to explain this association (O'Brien et al., 2011). The 
first of these posits that emotion understanding precedes and facilitates the development of 
theory of mind. Bartsch and Wellman (1995) provide evidence that children use desire and 
emotion terms earlier than talk about beliefs. This may be explained by the outwardly salient 
nature of emotions, compared to the internal nature of mental states. Children may be able to 
recognise instances in which their emotions differ to someone else’s more readily as the other 
person’s emotions are quite apparent, whereas their mental state and beliefs are not so 
obvious (O'Brien et al., 2011). Recognising instances in which their emotions do not match 
those of another, may lead children to consider why they do not match. This may in turn, 
facilitate the development of their understanding of more complex mental states such as 
belief (Bartsch & Estes, 1996). This hypothesis is consistent with Pons et al.’s finding that 
children label emotions before they connect emotions to beliefs, and with other studies that 
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have shown children pass emotion understanding tasks before they pass false-belief tasks 
(Dunn et al., 1991; O'Brien et al., 2011).  
The second hypothesis suggests that theory-of-mind development precedes and 
facilitates emotion understanding. According to this view, children recognise and understand 
the beliefs and desires of others, before they can understand their emotions. Insight into how 
someone else’s beliefs and desires differ to their own is thought to help children to 
understand the motivations for others’ emotions. In line with this hypothesis several studies 
have found evidence for a lag between children’s ability to understand false beliefs and their 
ability to correctly predict a character’s emotion based on this false belief, although these 
studies were cross-sectional, so unable to fully address the longitudinal association (Bradmetz 
& Schneider, 1999; De Rosnay et al., 2004; Hadwin & Perner, 1991).  
The third hypothesis posits that emotion understanding and theory of mind develop 
independently of one another. While they develop concurrently, this hypothesis sees the two 
as causally unrelated, meaning that the development of emotion understanding has no effect 
on the development of theory of mind, despite certain factors, such as language, having 
independent effects on each. Cutting and Dunn (1999) provided support for this hypothesis, 
finding that after accounting for children’s age, family background, and language ability, 
neither emotion understanding nor performance on false belief tasks made independent 
contributions to the other.  
While much research has focused on how emotion understanding influences theory-
of-mind development, questions remain over what else contributes to children’s 
understanding of others’ mental states. One construct of interest that has received little 
attention in this regard is empathy. Empathy is strongly related to emotion understanding, but 
has more complex demands, as it requires one to recognise and experience someone else’s 
emotions (Findlay et al., 2006). 
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While emotion understanding may prompt children to consider others’ differing 
beliefs, it may not be complex enough to account for the deeper reasoning that children 
demonstrate as their theory of mind advances. In more demanding theory-of-mind tasks, 
children must put themselves in the position of another to understand their mental perspective 
and how it affects their inner experience. This becomes especially challenging when the 
other’s desires differs from that of the child. Harris et al. (1989) assessed children’s ability to 
account for the desires and beliefs of a character, and consider how these would affect the 
character emotionally. Children are told a story about a mischievous monkey. Knowing that 
his friend, the horse, only likes to drink Coke and hates to drink milk, the monkey sneakily 
fills the horse’s (opaque) Coke bottle with milk. The child is asked how the horse is feeling 
before he takes a sip, and how he feels after taking a sip. The child must understand that the 
horse is unaware there is milk in the coke bottle, and be able to infer how the horse is feeling 
depending on their state of knowledge. Furthermore, the child must be able to separate their 
own desires and preferences from those of the horse. Not only does this task require emotion 
understanding and belief understanding, but it also requires empathy, as the child must put 
themselves in the position of the horse, to correctly determine how it is feeling.  
Empathy  
Empathy can be viewed as an extension of emotional understanding as it requires one 
to recognise and experience another person’s emotional state (Findlay et al., 2006; Nichols et 
al., 2009). Hoffman (2008) defines empathy as an emotional state that is triggered by the 
emotional state, or situation of another person. The emotional state experienced reflects what 
the other person feels, or what they are expected to feel, given their situation. An extension of 
empathy is mature empathy. This is a metacognitive ability, as it requires one to be aware that 
they are empathising, and aware that the emotion they feel is in response to the other person’s 
misfortune, not their own (Hoffman, 2008). Mature empathy therefore requires one to 
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understand that others are separate beings with independent inner states. Hoffman argues that 
before age 4, a child can empathise, but cannot show mature empathy.  
Two key skills have been proposed as prerequisites to the ability to empathise 
(Nichols et al., 2009). First, as mentioned above, emotion understanding appears to be 
important. In order for a child to correctly interpret another’s emotional state, they must first 
recognise it. Nichols et al. (2009) found that emotion understanding explained individual 
differences in empathic responses to peer distress in 12-24 month olds. Second, numerous 
scholars have argued for the importance of self-concept in the development of empathy, 
stating that children must understand that another person’s distress is unique to them and that 
their distress is a product of their unique perspective on the world (Hoffman, 2001; Moore, 
2007). Consistent with this, Nichols et al. also found self-concept predicted empathic 
responding to peer distress.  
Hoffman (1987) theorised the existence of four levels of empathy which develop 
sequentially, these have been labelled by Rieffe et al. (2010). The first of these is ‘Emotion 
Contagion’. It refers to an infant’s tendency in their first year to attend to others’ emotions 
and respond in a similar affective way (Hatfield et al., 1993). A common example is a baby 
responding to crying by crying, although some argue that this response may actually be due 
to the aversive sound of another crying, or to an inability to self-regulate (Rieffe et al., 2010; 
Ruffman et al., 2017). The second level, ‘Attention to Others’ Feelings’, describes how at 
around 1-year-old, infants realise that while they feel distress when another expresses 
distress, they are not the one who is in any danger or pain. This leads to a better regulation of 
their empathic responses. Level three, ‘Prosocial Actions’, is when children, generally in their 
second year, are thought to become increasingly responsive to the emotions of others, and 
begin to act prosocially. The fourth level, developing in late childhood is ‘Empathy for 
Another’s Life Condition’. This describes empathy that is expressed in response to general 
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distress or deprivation in others, rather than only in specific situations. Based on the first 
three levels of emotion understanding, Rieffe et al. (2010) created the Empathy Questionnaire 
(EmQue), a parent-report measure designed to assess empathy in young children.  
Given false-belief tasks require a child to understand that their own mental states are 
unique, it is likely that empathy development is related to false-belief task performance. It 
may be that emotion understanding facilitates empathy, which in turn facilitates theory of 
mind. Their experience of empathy may help them to realise the differences between their 
own and others’ mental states with regard to emotions, with this knowledge then facilitating 
an understanding of how other mental states, such as thoughts and beliefs differ. 
Alternatively, theory of mind may facilitate empathy. Perhaps children cannot experience 
others’ emotions as separate to their own without an existing understanding that people have 
differing emotions, and that these arise from differing thoughts and beliefs. A third possibility 
is of course that empathy and theory of mind are independent constructs with common factors 
such as emotion understanding making contributions to each. The relation between empathy 
had theory of mind has received little attention and therefore further research into each of 
these pathways is required. One indicator of a child’s empathy that has received some 
attention with regard to its association with theory of mind is prosociality.  
Prosocial Behaviour 
Children high in empathy tend to show more prosocial behaviours than their less 
empathic peers (Eisenberg & Miller, 1987). Prosocial behaviours are actions that are intended 
to benefit others, such as sharing and helping (Eisenberg, 1982). Prosocial behaviours evolve 
throughout childhood, beginning in the second year, during which children act prosocially by 
helping others achieve goals. This form of helping, known as instrumental helping, sees 
children assist others to achieve practical goals, for example passing them an item they have 
dropped. Instrumental helping tasks involve few emotion cues and tend to be of ‘low cost’ to 
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the child, meaning they do not have to give up an item or activity in order to help (Aitken, 
2019). Further development sees children begin to share with others, comfort those in 
emotional distress, and later, cooperate with others to achieve mutual goals (Dunfield & 
Kuhlmeier, 2013; Paal & Bereczkei, 2007; Warneken & Tomasello, 2007). One measure of 
more advanced prosociality is empathic helping which usually emerges from 30 months of 
age (Brownell et al., 2013; Svetlova et al., 2010). Empathic helping requires children to 
comfort others in, and resolve emotion-based problems. For example, if a child observes 
another person displaying sadness over a broken toy, the child could comfort them with 
words and touch, and/or resolve the problem by offering them a new toy. Aitken’s findings 
indicated that instrumental helping is a necessary precursor to empathic helping.  
Variation in when children begin to show prosocial behaviours has been linked with 
differences in emotion understanding, self-concept, and in the ability to take the visual, 
mental, and emotional perspectives of others (Bischof-Köhler, 1991; Denham, 1986; Eggum 
et al., 2011; Ensor et al., 2011; Ornaghi et al., 2016). Like empathy, prosociality requires 
insight into the mental states of another, thus prosociality and theory of mind may be 
associated. Imuta et al. (2016) found a small, significant association between concurrent 
theory of mind and prosocial behaviour in children aged 2-12 years. They put forward two 
explanations for this finding: first, the small correlation may underrepresent the true relation 
between theory of mind and prosocial behaviour, or second, theory of mind may be a 
condition that is necessary, but not sufficient for prosocial behaviour, with other factors like 
motivation being important. Eggum et al. (2011) found a positive association that was 
approaching significance between theory of mind at 54 months, and parent-reported 
prosociality at 72 months. Two pathways could explain a longitudinal association between 
the prosociality and theory of mind. Success on theory-of-mind tasks may be necessary 
before a child can demonstrate the perspective taking required for prosocial behaviours, or 
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alternatively, mature empathy may be a prerequisite for prosocial behaviour, which in turn, 
informs a child’s theory of mind as it allows children to see how actions affect others’ mental 
states. Ornaghi et al. (2016) found that theory of mind and child language ability mediated 
the relationship between emotion understanding and prosocial orientation in children aged 4-
6-years. This finding provides support for the former hypothesis which sees theory of mind 
precede prosociality, although a longitudinal study would be necessary to confirm this. As 
yet, the direction of the longitudinal relationship between prosociality and theory of mind 
remains to be determined.  
Language abilities have been proposed to account for some variability in prosociality 
between children (Cassidy et al., 2003). Children with more advanced language skills, may 
have better emotion understanding and perspective taking abilities, and therefore show more 
prosocial behaviours. While some have found that verbal abilities mediate the association 
between emotion understanding and prosociality, others have found emotion understanding to 
mediate the association between early verbal abilities and later prosociality (Cassidy et al., 
2003; Ensor & Hughes, 2005; Ensor et al., 2011).  
Gender has also been proposed to account for some variability in child prosociality, 
with Fabes and Eisenberg (1998) concluding that a gender difference favouring females is 
evident from age two. They stated that stereotyped gender roles mean that females are 
expected and believed to be more empathic and prosocial than males, while males are 
stereotyped as being independent and achievement oriented. Somewhat consistent with this is 
Aitken’s (2019) finding that boys provided faster help than girls during an instrumental 
helping task, while girls showed more empathic concern during an empathic helping task, 
although it must be noted that gender differences were not observed in this group of children 
on 10 other helpings tasks.  
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Social Correlates of Theory of Mind 
There are several known proximal and distal social influences on theory-of mind-
development. Three of the most widely studied correlates are SES, family size, and parent 
mental state talk (Devine & Hughes, 2018). Of these, parent mental state talk is a proximal 
correlate, while SES and family size constitute distal correlates of theory of mind. 
Additionally, research suggests the importance of gender as a distal correlate in the 
development of theory of mind (Kołodziejczyk & Bosacki, 2015). 
Socio-Economic Status  
SES has been shown to impact on a number of areas of child development, including 
language abilities and executive function, with children of a lower SES tending to fall behind 
those with a higher SES (Hoff, 2006; Noble et al., 2005). SES has been found to be positively 
correlated with theory-of-mind development (Cole & Mitchell, 1998; Cutting & Dunn, 1999), 
with this correlation remaining even after controlling for language (Devine & Hughes, 2018). 
Lillard (2006) suggested that these differences are due to how children from different socio-
economic backgrounds explain behaviours. She found lower SES children living in rural 
areas in the United States explained people’s actions with external factors, such as their 
physical circumstance, or social norms, while children of higher SES from urban areas tended 
to use internal explanations, attributing people’s behaviour to their character traits and mental 
states. Cole and Mitchell (1998) suggested that parents with a lower SES may experience 
greater stress and therefore struggle to use the reasoning styles that promote insight into the 
mind. Another common theory to explain the association relates to parents use of language. 
Parents of higher SES tend to talk to their children more and use a richer vocabulary, than 
those of lower SES, and children of higher SES tend to have superior vocabulary skills (Hoff-
Ginsberg, 1998). As discussed earlier, child language plays a key role in the development of 
theory of mind. The association between SES and theory of mind may therefore be mediated 
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by parental and child language. In line with this theory, Cutting and Dunn (1999) proposed 
that the frequency, form, and content of conversations between parents and children may 
explain much of the SES-related differences in child theory of mind. 
Siblings  
The number of siblings a child has may influence their theory-of-mind development. 
Children with siblings have been found to succeed on theory of mind tasks earlier than their 
peers without (Dunn et al., 1991; Perner et al., 1994). This association could be explained by 
children with siblings having increased opportunities to gain insights into the thoughts, 
feelings and actions of another who is similar to the child, increased opportunities for pretend 
play and therefore an earlier understanding of pretence, increased exposure to parental talk 
about causality, moral issues, and conflict management, and increased opportunity for talk 
about others’ mental states and actions (Dunn, 1994; Dunn et al., 1991; Lewis et al., 1996; 
Perner et al., 1994). Some studies have found theory-of-mind developed only to be associated 
with the number of older siblings a child has (Lewis et al., 1996; Ruffman et al., 1998). 
Ruffman et al. suggested that skilled older siblings with greater insight into mental states, 
facilitate advances their younger sibling’s theory of mind by sharing their knowledge. 
McAlister and Peterson (2007) however, found that having a greater number of child-aged 
siblings (aged 1–12 years) was most predictive of high scores on theory-of-mind tasks. 
Devine and Hughes (2018) found a modest but significant correlation between pre-schooler’s 
false-belief understanding and total number of siblings that was stronger when the siblings 
were around the same age as the child, as opposed to being in infancy or adolescence. 
Whether the sibling was older or younger did not have a significant effect. While a there is 
much support for the effect of siblings on theory of mind, some studies have failed to confirm 
this effect, finding no association between siblings of any age and theory of mind (Jenkins & 




There are mixed findings regarding the effect of gender on theory of mind 
development (Kołodziejczyk & Bosacki, 2015). While some studies have found female 
children achieve higher scores than male children on theory-of-mind tasks (Bosacki & Wilde 
Astington, 1999; Calero et al., 2013; Charman et al., 2002; Devine & Hughes, 2013; Walker, 
2005), others found no significant effect of gender (Hughes & Cutting, 1999; Hughes et al., 
2011).  
Parent Mental State Talk.  
Many have emphasised the role of social experiences in the development of emotion 
understanding and theory-of-mind, and indeed these have proven important through 
correlates such as parent mental state talk (Carpendale & Lewis, 2004; Drummond et al., 
2014). The quality and quantity of mental state talk that a child is exposed to in their 
formative years has been shown to be influential in a child’s developing language and social 
understanding (Drummond et al., 2014; Ruffman et al., 2002; Slaughter et al., 2007). Mental 
state talk refers to a wide range of terms. It encompasses terms that describe mental states 
such as want and love, emotions such as annoyed and surprised, cognitions such as remember 
and guess, modulations of assertion such as curious and sure, and terms about the senses such 
as look or hot (Taumoepeau & Ruffman, 2006).  
One reason that parent mental state talk may be important in developing social 
understanding is through its influence on child language abilities. Taumoepeau and Ruffman 
(2006) found mothers’ use of desire terms with their 15-month-old infants predicted infants’ 
use of mental state terms at 24-months.  They suggested this could be explained by children 
learning the words they hear most consistently and by mother mental state talk helping 
making children’s existing implicit knowledge about mental states explicit. In regard to 
parent use of cognitive terms specifically, Tompkins et al. (2018) suggested that references to 
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cognitions increased children’s lexical-semantic abilities by teaching children about words 
they cannot see e.g. think. They also suggested that understanding sentential complements 
allows children to understand how thought compares to reality, for example, in the sentence 
“She thought it was candy.” Children’s increased language abilities may then facilitate 
theory-of-mind development.  
Dunn et al. (1991) found that children from families who spoke frequently about 
emotions when the child was 33-months-old, performed better in tasks assessing emotion 
understanding, and theory of mind at 40-months and similar findings were reported by Ensor 
and Hughes (2008). Taumoepeau and Ruffman (2008) found that mothers’ use of desire 
terms with 15-month-olds predicted emotion understanding at 24 months, while mothers’ use 
of cognition terms with 24-month-olds was the most stable predictor of emotion 
understanding at 33-months. The positive association between early parent mental state talk 
and later theory of mind has also been demonstrated in longitudinal studies (Dunn et al., 
1991; Meins et al., 1998) with Ruffman et al. (2002) finding a causal relation between the 
two.  
Several studies have examined how parent mental state language changes as a child 
develops. It appears that parents tend to use desire terms (e.g. “want”) significantly more with 
infants, gradually increasing their use of terms referring to cognitions (e.g. “think”, “know” 
and “believe”) through toddlerhood (Beeghly et al., 1986; Ruffman et al., 2002). 
Taumoepeau and Ruffman (2006) studied a group of toddlers from 15- to 24-months-old and 
found that mothers changed their mental state talk as their child developed, talking about 
desires more frequently when their children were younger, and then about beliefs as the child 
grew. Taumoepeau and Ruffman suggested that desire terms are used early on in parent-child 
interactions because parents recognise that infants have some understanding of goals, and 
because infants’ existence is largely reliant on the ongoing fulfilment of desires. Desires are 
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therefore highly salient and talk of desires is more common. Infants’ understanding of desires 
may be facilitated by facial expressions and actions that make them easier to understand 
(Bretherton & Beeghly, 1982). Correlations between parents’ early use of desire terms and 
later theory of mind suggest that children learn about beliefs through paernts’ discussions of 
desires (Bartsch & Wellman, 1995; Slaughter & Gopnik, 1996). Findings from Ruffman et al. 
support the association between parents’ early talk of desires and theory of mind at 3-5 years, 
but also showed that parents’ use of cognition terms such as “think”, “know”, and 
modulations of assertions subsequently became more important in facilitating the 
development of theory of mind. References to thinking and knowing expose children to the 
notion that thoughts and knowledge differ between individuals, while modulations of 
assertion support theory of mind development by making reference to the uncertainty of 
thoughts and knowledge (Ruffman et al., 2002; Taumoepeau & Ruffman, 2008).  
In addition to the content of parents’ mental state talk, who the parent refers to when 
talking about mental states is also associated with children’s social understanding. Several 
theories have been suggested to explain the association between children’s social 
understanding and parents’ references to their child’s mental states (Taumoepeau & Ruffman, 
2006). First, it may be that talking about the children’s mental states gives them insight into 
their own states, which then allows them to understand the states of others (Nichols & Stich, 
2003; Ruffman, 2014). Second, it may be that talking about children’s mental states provides 
them with the language to be able to explicitly differentiate themselves from others 
(Ruffman, 2000, 2014). Last, talking about child mental states may increase child 
engagement and participation in conversation, which in turn supports the development of 
social understanding (Taumoepeau & Ruffman, 2006). With regard to references to others’ 
mental states, Taumoepeau and Ruffman suggested that these may facilitate social 
understanding by emphasising that others’ mental states can differ to those of the child. 
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Studies have shown that mothers tend to initially make more references to their child’s 
emotions and desires up to age two, increasing their references to the mental states of others 
as the child after this (Baldwin, 1991; Dunn et al., 1987; Taumoepeau & Ruffman, 2006).  
It appears that by adapting the content and referent of their mental state talk to the 
child’s developmental level, mothers provide a framework that allows the child to gradually 
learn about increasingly complex aspects of social understanding (Drummond et al., 2014). 
This is in line with the zone of proximal development whereby parents ‘scaffold’ their child’s 
understanding of the mind by using mental state language that is more advanced than the 
child’s abilities, but not so advanced that the child cannot follow (Fernyhough, 1996; Meins 
et al., 2002).  
Parent-child interactions have also been shown to be important in the development of 
prosociality with a number of studies examining the association between the two (Garner et 
al., 2008; Grusec, 1991; Ruffman et al., 2006). Brownell et al. (2013) for example, found that 
children whose parents elicited more talk of others’ emotions from their child when reading a 
wordless picture book, demonstrated more helping and sharing behaviour in response to an 
adult in need. Their study also revealed that parent mental state talk was predictive of child 
engagement in empathic but not instrumental helping. Drummond et al. (2014) suggested that 
mental state talk facilitates prosocial responses by scaffolding the child’s ability to 
understand the emotions and desires of others, and to respond to them. There are two 
potential directions of the association between prosociality and parent mental state talk. On 
the one hand, interactions that are responsive and co-operative may influence later prosocial 
behaviours, by motivating children to use their emotion understanding abilities for prosocial 
purposes (Ensor et al., 2011). Farrar et al. (1997) found that more responsive mothers were 
more likely to discuss feelings with children, and suggested that this leads children to be 
more receptive to the emotions of others. Conversely, parents may adjust their mental state 
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talk based on their child’s early prosociality, and scaffold its ongoing development. Indeed, 
Aitken (2019) found that parents adapted their mental state talk in response to children’s 
helping behaviour.  
While a number of studies have investigated how the frequency, content, and referent 
of mental state talk correlates with theory of mind and emotion understanding, and some 
studies have investigated its relation with prosociality, an indicator of empathy, the nature of 
the relationship between empathy and parent mental state talk remains unclear. It is also of 
interest to investigate whether parent mental state talk plays a role in the hypothesised 
relation between early empathy and later theory of mind. Given early empathy may facilitate 
later theory of mind, parent mental state talk may prove to play a mediating role in this 
association, with parents adapting their mental state talk in response to their child’s empathy. 
In doing so they would build on their child’s existing knowledge of others’ emotional 
experience and scaffold their understanding of more complex concepts such as others’ beliefs 
and knowledge.  
There is limited evidence of a gender effect on the amount of mental state talk used by 
parents, with Drummond et al. (2014) finding that parents used more mental state talk in their 
interactions with girls than boys. Other studies however have not found gender to affect the 
quantity of mental state talk parents use with their children (Brownell et al., 2013; Chang et 
al., 2017; van der Pol et al., 2015).  
The Current Study 
While considerable research has investigated the association between emotion 
understanding and theory of mind, and some has investigated the relation between theory of 
mind and prosocial behaviours, the link between empathy and theory of mind has received 
little attention. This is surprising given the considerable overlap between the skills required 
for a child to demonstrate empathy, and those required to pass false-belief tasks. It is 
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therefore of interest to determine how the two constructs are longitudinally associated. 
Empathy may be a prerequisite to developing theory of mind, or conversely, theory of mind 
may facilitate empathy development. Alternatively, the two may be initially related but then 
become unrelated with age, or finally, there may be no association between empathy and 
theory of mind development.  
Of further interest, is whether parent mental state talk plays a role in this purported 
association. Two pathways could explain an interaction between early empathy, parent 
mental state talk, and later theory of mind. First, early empathy may drive parent mental state 
talk, which in turn influences theory of mind development. This suggests that parents of more 
empathetic children recognise their child attending to and responding to others’ emotions, 
and use their language to promote further understanding of the mental states underlying the 
others’ emotions. By helping their child to consider others’ mental states they also support 
their child’s developing theory of mind. Alternatively, it may be that empathy is the 
intermediary. This suggests that parent mental state talk drives empathy, which in turn, drives 
theory-of-mind development. In this model, children whose parents use more mental state 
talk are likely to show greater empathy, and subsequently develop a more advanced theory of 
mind than their same age peers. 
Gaining insight into which of these pathways is more representative of how theory of 
mind develops is important. Not only would it clarify the developmental pathway that leads 
to theory of mind development, but it would also have important practical implications. 
Interventions teaching parents how to use mental state talk could be put into practice, 
targeting families whose children may otherwise fall behind their peers.  
In addition to parent mental state talk, several other social correlates will likely have 
an effect on the association between empathy and theory of mind. These include SES, gender, 
and the number of older siblings a child has. Given these potential influences, it will be 
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important to control for these variables when examining the association between empathy and 
theory of mind. 
Using a longitudinal design, this study will investigate the association between early 
empathy and later false-belief understanding in young children, and the role of parent mental 
state talk in this association. The current study will involve a group of child participants and 
their parents who were seen at four time points for an earlier study, From Goal- to Emotion-
based Helping: The Interactive Roles of Toddlers’ Social Understanding and Connectedness 
of Parental Mental State Talk (Aitken, 2019). Aitken’s study focused on child empathy, self-
concept and helping behaviour, and parent mental state talk. Specifically, children aged 1-2-
years-old were assessed on their social understanding through instrumental and empathic 
helping tasks, parent-reported self-concept, and parent-reported-empathy. They were assessed 
on their language using two measures of vocabulary, and parents were assessed on their use 
of mental state language through a picture book interaction task. This data will be averaged 
across the four time points to create scores on each measure, these average scores will 
represent children’s performance at the ‘early time point’. These children were seen again 2-3 
years later when they were aged 3- to 6-years-old for the purpose of the current study, and 
further data was collected. At this later time point children’s social understanding was 
examined through tasks that assessed false belief understanding, emotion understanding, 
empathy, and prosociality. Child general language ability was assessed and parent mental 
state talk was again assessed using the picture book task. Data from the early and later time 
points will be compared to examine the development of social understanding and the role of 
parent mental state talk in this development.  
By comparing the same children and their parents when the children were 
approximately 19-months-old with when they are around 4.5-years-old, we will be able to 
determine which of the aforementioned pathways best explains the development of theory of 
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mind. There are four key hypotheses. First, that early empathy is predictive of later theory of 
mind, second that empathy and theory of mind will be associated at the later time point, third 
that parent mental state talk will mediate the association between early empathy and later 
theory of mind, and last, that parent mental state talk, empathy and theory of mind will be 
associated at the later time point.  
Method 
Participants 
Participants were recruited from an existing database of 72 parent–child dyads 
participants (44 girls and 28 boys) who took part in the wider study, The Foundations of 
Social Understanding. Child participants and their parents participated in four previous time 
points (T1, T2, T3, T4) and were recruited in three cohorts. Children in cohort 1 (C1) were 
15-months at T1, those in cohort 2 (C2) were 19-months at T1, and those in cohort 3 (C3) 
were 23-months at T1. Each parent-child dyad was seen monthly for four months. Children 
were recruited in cohorts so the study covered ages 15-26 months, without requiring each 
child to have 12 time points. Results of the first four time points are reported in Jessica 
Aitken’s (2019) PhD thesis From Goal- to Emotion-based Helping: The Interactive Roles of 
Toddlers’ Social Understanding and Connectedness of Parent Mental State Talk. 
A fifth time point was then conducted for the purpose of the current study by the 
author and assisted by another research student. Fifty-five of the existing participants and 
their parents returned and completed the fifth time-point. The average age of these 55 
participants at the early time point was 20.5 months (range 16-27 months). These 55 children 
had an average age of 4.6 years (range 3.5-6.8 years), and thirty-five were female. Complete 
age and gender demographics for the fifth time point are presented in Table 1. Child 




Table 1  
Age and Gender of Child Participants at Later Time Point  
 3-year-olds 4-year-olds 5-year-olds 6-year-olds Total 
 N % n % n % n % n % 
Male 4 44.4 14 36.8 2 40 0 0 20 36.4 
Female 5 55.6 24 63.2 3 60 3 100 35 63.6 
Total 9  38  5  3  55  
 
Table 2  
Ethnicities of Child Participants at Later Time Point 
NZ European NZ Māori Cook Island 
Māori 
Fijian Indian Other 
n % n % n % n % n % n % 
53 96.4 7 12.7 1 1.8 1 1.8 1 1.8 8 14.5 
Note. Ethnicity percentages do not add to 100 due to multi-ethnicities. 
Procedure 
Early Time Points (T1-T4) 
Parents and children were tested in the University of Otago Psychology Department. 
Sessions took no longer than 45-minutes and took place in a large playroom. Participants 
were seen monthly for four months and testing spanned over two years. One week prior to 
each session, parents completed measures of their child’s general language ability online. A 
primary and assistant experimenter were present at each session. To begin the session, the 
experimenters engaged in a play activity for approximately five minutes with the toddler to 
build rapport and allow the toddler to become familiar with the environment. Parents were 
included in this activity but were asked to refrain from responding to the experimenter in the 
subsequent tasks. Children were then engaged in tasks with the experimenter that assessed 
instrumental and empathic helping behaviour (all four time points) and self-recognition (T1 
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and T3). During this time, parents completed questionnaires on their child’s mental state 
vocabulary, empathy, and self-awareness. They were positioned at a desk in the corner of the 
room unless the child was uncomfortable being separated from them, in which case they sat 
beside the child. Parents and children then did a book reading task (T1 and T3), or a play task 
(T2 and T4) to assess parents’ use of mental state language. All sessions were video recorded. 
At the conclusion of each session parents were given a $10 voucher and children were given 
a small toy. See Table 3 for a summary of early time point measures.  
Later Time Point (T5) 
Parents were contacted via telephone to determine their interest in participating in the 
fifth time point, and to organise an appointment. Participants living in Dunedin were seen at 
the University of Otago Psychology Department, while those living out of Dunedin were seen 
in their homes. Participants then received an email with their appointment time and an 
information sheet on the study (Appendix A). This described the focus of the experiment as 
being on children’s social development and how parents play a role in this development.  
Upon arrival to the university, parents were asked to sign two consent forms, one 
obtaining their consent to take part in the experiment, and one consenting for the child’s 
participation (Appendix B). Each parent and their child then engaged in a book reading task 
together. Parents then completed a questionnaire on their child’s empathy and provided 
demographic information, while the child engaged in a series of tasks with the experimenter. 
First, children completed a false belief task, followed by a general language assessment, 
another false belief task, a test of emotion understanding, an empathic helping task, and a 
prosocial stories task. Finally, the parent was asked to describe their child. During this time 
the child played with toys. A full summary of the tasks is presented in Table 3. All sessions 
were video recorded. At the conclusion of the session, the child was presented with a small 
gift to thank them for their participation and parents were provided with $20 worth of fuel 
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vouchers to reimburse them for any costs they incurred in participating. Parents were issued 
with a debrief form, describing the purpose of each task conducted during the experiment 
(Appendix C). Any questions parents had were answered, and they were asked if they were 
open to being contacted regarding participation in future time-points.  
Table 3 
Summary of Tasks at the Earlier (T1-T4) and Later (T5) Time Points 
 Time 1 Time 2 Time 3 Time 4 Time 5 
Parent MCDI-NZ MCDI-NZ  MCDI-NZ  MCDI-NZ   
MS Checklist MS Checklist MS Checklist MS Checklist 
SUQ EmQue SUQ EmQue EmQue 
Describe 
Child 
Parent-child Book Task  Book Task  Book 
task 














    TEC 
    Prosocial 
Story 
    FBUC 
FBCL 
Note. MCDI-NZ = MacArthur Communicative Development Inventory (New Zealand 
adaptation); MS Checklist = Mental State Checklist; SUQ = UCLA Self-Understanding 
Questionnaire; EmQue = Empathy Questionnaire; CELF = Clinical Evaluations of Language 
Fundamentals Preschool–Second Edition–Australian Standardised Edition; INT/EMP-
S/EMP-P helping = instrumental; empathic-sadness, and empathic-pain helping tasks; 
Blanket = blanket helping task; TEC = Test of Emotion Comprehension; Prosocial Story= 
Prosocial Story Task; FBUC = unexpected contents false belief task; FBCL = contents 




Early Time Points (T1-T4) 
Demographic Information. To control for socio-economic influences parents 
provided information on their education. Education was ranked on a scale from 1 to 8, where 
1 represents no high school qualification, and 8 represents a university postgraduate degree or 
diploma. An education score was calculating by averaging across both parents. To collect 
information on children’s ethnicities, parents were asked to endorse one or more ethnicities 
that their child belonged to from the following list: New Zealand Māori, New Zealand 
European, Samoan, Tongan, Cook Island Māori, Fijian, Tokelauan, Niuean, Chinese, and 
Indian. Any other ethnicity was included in an ‘Other’ section. We were interested in a more 
detailed Pacific ethnicity list than is recorded in Statistics New Zealand census.  
Child Language  
MacArthur Communicative Development Inventory. Parents completed the New 
Zealand adaptation of the MacArthur Communicative Development Inventory (MCDI-NZ; 
Reese & Read, 2000) at T1, T2, T3, and T4. This was provided one week prior to each 
session through the online program, Qualtrics. The MCDI-NZ required parents to indicate 
which productive words their child was using off a checklist of words. For the current study, 
an MCDI overall early time point score was created by averaging children’s scores on the 
measure across the four time points.  
Mental State Checklist.  At T1, T2, T3, and T4 parents completed the Mental State 
(MS) Checklist, a supplementary mental state language subscale of the MCDI-NZ  
(Taumoepeau & Ruffman, 2006). The MS Checklist required parents to report on whether 
their child understood, or understood and used, words related to desires, beliefs, physical 
states, emotions, and the senses. This provided information on children’s receptive and 
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productive vocabulary. For the current study, an MS Checklist overall early time point score 
was created by averaging children’s scores on the measure across the four time points. 
Parent Mental State Talk. 
 Book Task. At T1 and T3 parents completed the book task which required them to 
discuss a series of photographs with their children for five minutes (Taumoepeau & Ruffman, 
2006). The photographs were selected from those used by Taumoepeau and Ruffman as they 
were age appropriate and depicted people in emotive situations which stimulate conversations 
about mental states. Different photographs were used at T1 and T3. Parents were instructed to 
“go through the book just like you are reading a story at home”. The experimenter left the 
room for five minutes and the interaction was video recorded. Parent utterances were coded 
using the computer software Interact (Mangold, 2010). Twenty-five percent of the 
interactions were double coded κ = .79). Parents’ utterances were averaged across the two 
time points to create an overall early time point score.  
Utterances were coded according to whether they were non-mental state utterances or 
mental state utterances using a protocol from Taumoepeau and Ruffman (2006). Mental state 
utterances were further coded according to content and referent. At the content level, 
utterances were categorised as either references to physical state emotions (e.g. “he’s 
laughing”), emotions (e.g. “she’s sad”), genuine desires (e.g. “he wants that toy”), desire 
directives (e.g. “do you want to turn the page for me”), thoughts (e.g. “I think that’s a goat”), 
knowledge (e.g. “you know what that is”), and to other cognitions (e.g. “he believes” or “I 
remember”). At the referent level, utterances were coded according to whether they referred 
to the parent, the child, or an other. See appendix D for the coding protocol.  
Child Social Understanding.   
UCLA Self-Understanding Questionnaire. Parents completed a shortened version of 
the UCLA Self-Understanding Questionnaire (SUQ; Appendix E) (Stipek et al., 1990) at T1 
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and T3. They responded to items pertaining to their child’s self-description and evaluation 
(12 items), self-recognition (5 items), and emotional response to wrong-doing (1 item) on a 
three-point Likert Scale (not yet, sometimes, often), allowing for a maximum score of 54. 
Participants’ scores were averaged across the two time points to create an overall early time 
point score which was used in the current study. The SUQ has previously been used in 
research with New Zealand populations (Taumoepeau & Reese, 2014).  
Empathy Questionnaire. The Empathy Questionnaire (EmQue) is a parent-report 
questionnaire designed to assess a child’s empathy (Rieffe et al., 2010). Parents were required 
to complete the EmQue at T2 and T4. The EmQue is composed of 20 items and asks parents 
to indicate how frequently their child demonstrates empathic behaviours that are generally 
observable in infants and young children. Parents rated each item on the degree to which it 
has applied to their child over the past two months, using a 3-point scale (0 = never, 1 = 
sometimes, 2 = often), allowing for a maximum score of 40. The EmQue was completed 
electronically during the session using Qualtrics. Scores were averaged across T2 and T4 to 
create an EmQue overall early time point score that was used in the current study.  
Factor analyses conducted by Rieffe et al. (2010) indicated that three one-dimensional 
factors are represented in the EmQue, these are Emotion Contagion, Attention to Others’ 
Feelings, and Prosocial Actions. Emotion contagion refers to a child’s tendency to react with 
distress upon observing another in distress. Attention to others’ feelings refers to children’s 
tendency to direct their attention to others’ affective displays, and prosocial actions describes 
a child’s propensity to respond to others’ emotions prosocially. In Rieffe et al.’s study, six 
items loaded onto the Emotion Contagion factor, seven loaded onto the Attention to Others’ 
Feelings factor, and six loaded onto the Prosocial Actions factor. One item failed to load onto 
any factors. The three factors were found to have acceptable internal consistency (Rieffe et al. 
2010). See Appendix F for the full questionnaire.  
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Instrumental and Empathic Helping Tasks. Children participated in ‘helping tasks’ 
at T1, T2, T3, and T4. At each session the experimenter pretended to encounter three 
problems while engaging in play with the child. The helping tasks were based on those by 
Brownell et al. (2013) and Svetlova et al. (2010), and adapted by Aitken (2019). Each 
simulation was initiated by the experimenter as they expressed having difficulty achieving a 
goal. After each expression of difficulty, the experimenter provided three increasingly clear 
cues of how the child could help. Each cue was provided after a 5-second interval until the 
child offered helping behaviour. On cue one the experimenter gave a non-verbal signal of 
distress, on cue two they named the problem, and on cue three they described their general 
need. If the child did not offer help after the third cue, the experimenter resolved the problem 
themselves or with the help of the other experimenter. Each difficulty required either goal-
based instrumental helping, emotion based empathetic helping behaviour for pain, or 
emotion-based empathetic helping behaviour for sadness. The experimenter knocking over a 
block tower he was attempting to build is an example of where the child could demonstrate 
instrumental helping by rebuilding the tower. The experimenter dropping a wooden block on 
his foot would require empathic helping for the pain, and the experimenter having a favourite 
toy removed would require empathic helping to make him feel better. Children were assessed 
on how quickly they attempted to help the experimenter, empathic concern for the 
experimenter, and the level of personal distress that they exhibited in response to the 
experimenter’s distress.  
Attempts to help, empathic concern, and personal distress were coded using the 
software Interact (Mangold, 2010) and a coding protocol developed for the study (Aitken, 
2019). For attempts to help, all attempts to help or provide comfort were coded according to 
how promptly the child helped. Helping promptness was coded on a four-point Likert scale (0 
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= no attempts to help; 1 = attempted to help after cue three; 2 = attempted to help after cue 
two; 3 = attempted to help after cue one).  
Empathic concern was evaluated based on the presence of emotional arousal that 
appeared to indicate sympathetic concern for the experimenter. This included sounds, 
statements, facial expressions and movements and was coded on a three-point Likert scale (1 
= no concern; 2 = transient concern; 3 = sustained concern). Personal distress was evaluated 
based on emotional arousal that appeared to indicate self-focused fear or distress. This 
included moving away from the experimenter, moving towards their parent, and crying, and 
was coded on a four-point Likert scale (1 = no distress, 2 = mild distress, 3 = moderate 
distress, 4 = extreme distress). Twenty percent of the simulations were double coded with full 
or good agreement on coding of attempts to help (κ = .79), empathic concern (κ = .78), and 
on personal distress (κ = .78)  
Later Time Point (T5) 
Demographics. At the later time point parents were asked whether their child was 
attending day-care, kindergarten, preschool or primary school, and how many hours per week 
were spent there.  
Child Language. 
Preschool CELF. Children were assessed on their language abilities using three 
subtests of the Clinical Evaluations of Language Fundamentals® Preschool–Second Edition–
Australian Standardised Edition (CELF Preschool–2 Australian; (Wiig et al., 2004)). The 
subtests used were Sentence Structure, Expressive Vocabulary, and Concepts and Following 
Directions. 
The Sentence Structure subtest assessed children’s’ ability to listen to and interpret 
increasingly complex spoken sentences. Children were presented with four pictures for each 
item, and asked to point to the picture that depicted a specific sentence. They were shown one 
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demonstration item and completed two trial items before beginning the subtest items. One 
point was given for each correct response and the child completed all 22 items unless they 
scored five consecutive scores of zero, in which case the subtest was discontinued. The 
maximum raw score was 22.  
The Expressive Vocabulary subtest determines how well a child can label illustrations 
of people, objects, and actions. The experimenter pointed to various pictures and asked the 
child to label them. Children were shown one demonstration item and completed two trial 
items before beginning the subtest items. Two points were given if the child gave the target 
response or another semantically correct response on an item. One point was given if their 
response was related to, but not the same as, the target response. All other responses were 
scored zero points. For example, when the experimenter points to a veterinarian and asks, 
“What is this person called?”, a two-point answer would be ‘veterinarian’ or ‘vet’ while a 
one-point answer would be ‘animal doctor’. Subtest administration was discontinued if the 
child gave seven consecutive zero-point responses. There were 20 items in total, allowing for 
a maximum raw score of 40.  
The Concepts and Following Directions subtest assessed several skills. First, the 
ability to interpret increasingly complex spoken directions that required logical operations. 
Second, the ability to remember the names, characteristics and order of pictures as given by 
the experimenter, third, to identify the target object(s) among several choices, and finally, to 
refrain from answering until instructed to do so. Children were given an instruction of which 
animals to point to, and were to point at the specified animal(s) when the experimenter said 
“Go”. Children had to successfully complete two familiarisation items before proceeding to 
two trial items and the subtest items. One point was awarded if the child pointed to the target 
object(s) in the specified order for each item. There were 22 items allowing for a maximum 
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raw score of 22. A total CELF score was formed by combining the children’s scores on the 
three subtests. This allowed for a maximum CELF total score of 84.  
Parent and Child Mental State Talk.  
Book Task. Parents and children completed the book task (described above) again at 
the later time point. The task was very similar but differed in that the time limit was removed 
and parents were instructed to “go through the book and discuss all the pictures as if you 
were reading a picture book at home.” Age appropriate pictures from Ruffman et al. (2002) 
were used at this time point. When participants were seen at the University, the experimenter 
left the room during the book task. When participants were visited in their homes, the 
experimenter was unable to leave the room, but instead sat as far from the participants as 
possible and occupied them self with an unobtrusive task with their eye gaze away from the 
participants. The coding software and protocol remained the same but both parent and child 
mental state utterances were coded at the later time point. Only parent mental state talk was 
used in the current study. Twenty percent of the interactions were double coded with coders 
reaching a high level of agreement κ = .89.  
Child Social Understanding. 
Empathy Questionnaire. Parents completed the Empathy Questionnaire (EmQue; 
described above) again at the later time point. It was completed electronically during the 
session using Qualtrics.  
Test of Emotion Comprehension. Children completed components three to eight of 
the Test of Emotion Comprehension (TEC; Pons et al., 2004), a widely used measure. These 
components assessed children’s understanding of how the desires and beliefs influence 
emotional reactions, how reminders of an emotional event can reactivate emotions, how 
emotions can be regulated, how outwardly expressed emotions can differ from internally 
experienced emotions, and how a person may experience multiple emotions at one point in 
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time. The TEC was presented as an interactive book. The experimenter read the child a series 
of short stories about a character matched to the child’s own gender. Throughout the stories 
the experimenter paused to ask the child target questions about the emotions of the characters 
as well as some memory questions. For each target question, the child was given a choice of 
four answers e.g. ‘happy’, ‘sad’, ‘alright’, or ‘angry’. Each answer was presented alongside a 
drawing of the character’s face depicting the emotions. A maximum of one point could be 
awarded for each target question and some components were comprised of multiple 
questions. Children could score a maximum of nine points.  
Prosocial Story Task. Children were presented with four stories about a character of 
the same age and gender as themselves. The stories were based on those used by Ornaghi et 
al. (2015), however two key adaptations were made. First, rather than posing an open 
question about what would happen next, children were presented with three story endings and 
asked to choose the one they thought most likely. Secondly, pictures were created to 
accompany not only the story starters but also each story ending. These changes were made 
as pilot testing indicated that children of the target age group struggled to give any response 
to the open question, and to lower the demands on memory and language.  
Each story focused on a specific prosocial behaviour: comforting, peace-making, 
sharing, or helping. At the beginning of the task children were told the following by the 
experimenter, “I’m going to read you some very short stories. Would you like to help me find 
an ending for them? The stories are about this little girl/boy whose name is Lucy/Harry. 
Lucy/Harry is about 3/4/5/6 years old like you. I am going to read the start of a story, and 
then read three different endings, you tell me which one you think will happen.” The four 
stories were read to the child and each story had an accompanying illustration. After each 
story, the child was asked which of three story endings they thought would happen next. The 
three alternate story endings were presented on another sheet of paper beside the story starter 
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and these varied. Once the child had chosen which story ending they thought would happen, 
they were asked why they chose it. Their explanations of why they chose each story ending 
were video recorded and later transcribed verbatim. See Appendix G for the female versions 
of the stories and story endings.  
The endings for each story varied in prosociality and were scored on a three-point 
Likert scale (0-2). Two-point endings saw the protagonist take action to alleviate the other 
characters’ distress, independently resolve conflict, and/or provide emotional support. One-
point endings saw the protagonist recognise the other characters’ distress, show sympathy, 
seek external support to resolve conflict, and/or take actions to resolve perceived injustice. 
Zero-point endings saw the protagonist make no effort to help the other characters or behave 
antisocially.  
The explanations children gave for their chosen story endings were also coded on a 
three-point Likert scale using a coding protocol developed by the author (Table 4). An 
inductive approach was taken to developing this coding protocol. First, explanations were 
grouped by accurate references to character’s mental states, accurate reference to physical 
states, normative responses, instrumental reasoning, justice-based reasoning, personal 
preferences, incorrect inferences of mental and physical states, repetitions of the questions, 
uncertainty, and failure to respond. These groupings were refined and a score was assigned to 
each of the final grouping, based on how well a child’s explanation made reference to the 
internal states of others or demonstrated a knowledge of what constitutes a prosocial action. 
Data from twenty percent of participants were double coded (κ = .93). The points awarded for 
the chosen ending, and those for the explanation were combined to give a prosocial story total 
score, with maximum possible score of 4 per story. The maximum possible total score on the 




Prosocial Story Explanation Coding Protocol 
Score Explanation Criteria 
2 
The child refers to how the chosen ending will affect the mental state(s) of the character(s) 
by correctly using mental state language in their explanation e.g. 'Because he will feel 
better'; the child correctly refers to how the chosen ending demonstrates the prosociality of 
the character(s) in their explanation e.g. 'Because that's a nice thing to do'; 'Because they're 
going to share'; the child refers to justice/injustice e.g. 'Because it's wrong to snatch things'; 
or the child refers to instrumental means of solving a problem 'She'll take the ball back and 
give it to her'. 
1 
The child correctly refers to how the chosen ending will affect the physical state of the 
character(s) in their explanation e.g. 'Because she's hurt'; or the child refers to how the 
chosen ending demonstrates observed norms or reflects their own usual practice, but does 
not refer to mental states or prosociality e.g. 'Because that's what you usually do' 
0 
The child refers to personal preference for the chosen ending e.g. ‘Because I like it’, repeats 
the story or chosen story ending when the ending has no reference to mental or physical 
state; repeats one of the alternative story endings; gives objectively irrelevant information 
e.g. ‘Pippa has a friend called George'; or the child does not give an answer or says 'I don't 
know'. 
 
Blanket Task. Children participated in an empathic helping task which assessed their 
ability and propensity to demonstrate empathetic helping by inferring the experimenter’s 
internal state and offering help. This task was based on the emotion condition wrapping task 
from Svetlova et al. (2010). Early on in the child-experimenter tasks, the experimenter 
expressed feeling cold by shivering, rubbing their arms and saying, “Brrr, I’m cold, I need 
my blanket.” They then wrapped themselves in a blanket and told the child it made them feel 
much better. After completing an unrelated task, the experimenter removed the blanket, told 
the child they were not cold anymore, and placed the blanket near the child, but out of their 
own reach. After completing several other tasks, the experimenter expressed feeling cold 
again. They shivered and rubbed their arms for ten seconds, this was cue one. If the child did 
not give the experimenter the blanket within ten seconds, the experimenter gave cue two by 
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saying, “Brrr, I’m cold.” If after ten seconds the blanket had not been presented, cue three 
was given by reaching palm down for the blanket and saying, “I’m cold, I need my blanket.” 
If the blanket was not given after ten seconds the fourth cue was administered. The 
experimenter reached palm up for the blanket and asked “(child’s name), can I have my 
blanket?” The child was scored on which cue they present the experimenter with the blanket. 
Four-points were awarded if they did so on cue one, 3-points were awarded for cue two, 2-
points were awarded for cue-three, and 1-point was awarded for cue four.  
Theory of Mind. Children completed two false belief tasks. First, they did an 
unexpected contents task in which they were presented with a closed Band-Aid box by the 
experimenter and asked what they believed the contents to be. They then looked inside the 
box where they found a small toy car. The box was closed again with the car inside. A small 
doll matched to the child’s own gender was then presented. The child was introduced to the 
doll and told that the doll had never seen inside the box before. They were then asked the 
target question, “What does (doll’s name) think is inside the plaster box?” This was followed 
by the memory question “Has (doll’s name) ever seen inside the box before?” To score one 
point, the child had to answer “Band-Aids” to the target question and “no” to the memory 
question. If these answers were not both given, the child scored zero points.  
Second, they completed a contents change in location task false belief task. In this 
task they were presented with a picture of a kitchen, and a doll matched to their own gender. 
The child was told that the doll had a chocolate bar which they placed in a drawer (pointed to 
by examiner) before going outside to play. The doll was placed out of the child’s sight. The 
child was then told “while (doll’s name) was outside, their mum came along and moved the 
chocolate from the drawer to the cupboard.” The child was then asked the target question, 
“When (doll’s name) returns, where will they look for the chocolate? In the drawer or in the 
cupboard?” This was followed by the memory question, “Did (doll’s name) see their mum 
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move the chocolate?” To score one point the child must answer ‘in the drawer’ to the target 
question, and ‘no’ to the memory question. If these answers are not both given, the child 
scored zero points. A false-belief understanding total score was formed by adding children’s 
scores in both tasks. This allowed for a maximum total score of two.  
Describe Child. Parents were asked to describe their child at the end of the session. 
Data from this task falls outside the scope of the current study and therefore is not reported 
on further.  
Results Part I 
Analysis plan 
To address the relationship between empathy and theory of mind across time and 
within the later time-point, several analyses were conducted. First, data reductions were 
made, these are described in the subsequent Data Reduction section. Using SPSS version 
26.0, t-tests and Mann-Whitney tests were then used to test for effects of social correlates on 
key variables. Next, correlations between early and later child social understanding and 
language variables were examined to establish any longitudinal associations. Correlations 
within later child social understanding and language variables were then examined. 
Regression analysis was then used to establish which early variables were key predictors of 
later variables. The p value was at .05, however where there were multiple comparisons 
family-wise error was adjusted using Holm’s correction.  
All variables were tested for normality and several were found to be skewed. In an 
attempt to normalise skewed data, square root transformations were made. This did not 
normalise the majority of the data however, and therefore non-parametric tests were used on 
the non-transformed data, unless otherwise stated. Standardised scores were created for child 
language variables at both time points. When checking for the effects of social correlates t-
tests were used for normally distributed variables and Mann-Whitney tests were used for non-
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normally distributed ones. When using t-tests homogeneity of variances were checked and 
where there were violations of homogeneity of variance, degrees of freedom were adjusted 
for. 
Data Reduction 
Due to limited range on the early empathic helping tasks an empathic helping total 
score was created for helping promptness, concern, and distress. In addition to the later time 
point Empathy Questionnaire (EmQue) total score, three other variables were formed from 
the later EmQue data. The data was separated into three separate variables according to the 
three factors found by Rieffe et al. (2010). Reliability of the later EmQue variables was 
measured using Cronbach’s Alpha and reliability of .68, .73, and .65 was found for Emotion 
Contagion, Attention to Others’ feelings, and Prosocial Actions respectively. This reliability 
acceptable for the current study. Both the EmQue total score and the three separated factors 
are used in the main analyses. Where there were more than four input variables in a 
regression model, an average early language variable was used in place of the individual 
MCDI and MS Checklist variables, to maintain no less than 10 cases per predictor variable 
(Tabachnick et al., 2007). This was formed by taking an average of the two standardised 
variables. 
Analyses involving early child social understanding and language variables only 
include 54 participants as one participant is missing data. Analyses involving later false-belief 
tasks and the TEC only include 54 participants, while analyses involving later CELF and 
blanket task variables only include 53 participants. This is because at the later time point one 
participant refused to participate in these four tasks. Another participant was missing data for 
the CELF as they could not be engaged with, and one other participant is missing data on the 
later empathic helping task due to experimenter error.  
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Preliminary Analyses  
Demographic Information 
Table 5 provides a summary of the descriptive statistics for child demographics 
including gender, age at the early and later time points, children with older siblings, parent 
education level. It also provides testing location at the later time point.  
Table 5 
Descriptive Statistics of Child Demographics  
 M Frequency SD Range 
All time points     





Age at earlier time 
point (average age 
across T1-T4) 
20.5 months  3.2 15.9 - 
26.6 
months 
Age at later time point 4.6 years  .06 3.5 – 6.8 
years 
Parent education level 5.7  1.8 1 - 8 
Children with one or 
more older siblings 
42.6% 23 - - 
Later time point only     
Tested at university  90.9% 50 - - 
Note. The parent education score refers to the average level of education across both parents 
on a scale where 1 represents no high school qualification, and 8 represents a university 
postgraduate degree or diploma.  
Socio-Economic Status 
Socio-economic status had a significant positive correlation with the SUQ rs (53) = 
.28, p = .044. It had no further significant correlations with early child social understanding 
or language variables (ps range = .308 - .864) or later ones (ps range = .164 - .738).  
Location 
At the later time point, no effect of testing location was found for later child social 




At the early time point gender differences were found for the MCDI, U = 187, p = 
.006, and the SUQ, U = 213, p = .023, with females scoring higher on both measures. At the 
later time point, gender differences were found for the TEC, t (52) = -2.15, p = .036, and the 
prosocial story task, U = 187, p = .004, with females scoring higher than males on both 
measures. Gender was included as a covariate in further analyses including these measures. 
No further gender differences were found on early child social understanding or language 
variables (ps range = .087 - .963), or on later ones (ps range = .129 - .692).  
Siblings 
Aside from the MCDI U = 233, p = .031, no older sibling effects were found for early 
child social understanding or language variables (ps range = .281 - .978). There were no older 




Table 6 contains the descriptives for the early child measures including the MCDI and 
MS Checklist raw scores, the EmQue, and helping promptness, concern, and distress on 
instrumental and empathic helping tasks.  
Table 6 
Descriptive Statistics of Early Child Demographics and Early Measures of Child Social 
Understanding  
 
M SD Range 
MCDI  166.8 183.0 2-610 
MS Checklist  3.9 7.6 0-37 
EmQue  16.9 5.1 8-29 
SUQ  14.7 8.3 3-36 
Helping Tasks    
Instr Help Pr  0.7 0.6 0-3 
Emp Help Pr  0.2 0.2 0-1 
Instr Help Cn  0.3 0.3 0-2 
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Emp Help Cn  0.6 0.3 0-1 
Instr Help Ds  0.0 0.1 0-1 
Emp Help Ds  0.1 0.2 0-1 
Note. MCDI stands for MacArthur Communicative Development Inventory, MS Checklist 
stands for Mental State Checklist, EmQue stand for Empathy Questionnaire, SUQ stands for 
UCLA Self-Understanding Questionnaire, Instr stands for instrumental, Emp stands for 
empathic, Pr stands for promptness, Cn stands for concern, Ds stands for distress.  
 
Table 7 contains the descriptives for the later child measures including the raw CELF 
total score, the false-belief total score, promptness on the empathic helping task, the TEC, the 
Prosocial Story Task total score, the three factors of the EmQue and the EmQue total score.  
Table 7 
Descriptive Statistics of Later Child Demographics and Later Measures of Child Social 
Understanding  
 M SD Range 
CELF  48.7 14.3 19-74 
False-belief tasks 1 0.8 0-2 
Blanket task 2.5 1 1-4 
TEC 4.3 2 0-8 
Prosocial Story Task 9.8 4.2 0-15 
EmQue    
Emotion Contagion factor 10.1 2.1 6-16 
Attention to Others’ Feelings 
factor 
17.7 2.2 13-21 
Prosocial Actions factor 13.4 2.1 10-18 
EmQue total 21.5 4.4 12-33 
Note. CELF stands for Clinical Evaluations of Language Fundamentals Preschool Second 
Edition, TEC stands for Test of Emotion Comprehension, EmQue stands for Empathy 
Questionnaire.   
 
Longitudinal Relations between Early and Later Child Social Understanding and Language  
Correlational analyses were used to determine the associations between early and later 
child social understanding and language, as shown in Table 8. First, associations between 
early general language and later child social understanding were calculated to determine 
where early language needed to be used as a control variable. Next, associations between 
early and later social understanding, were examined.  
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Early General Language Ability. Both the MCDI and the MS Checklist, had 
significant positive correlations with later performance on the CELF, false-belief 
understanding, the TEC, and the Attention to Others’ Feelings factor of the EmQue. They 
were not significantly correlated with the later blanket task, the Prosocial Story Task, the 
other factors of the later EmQue, or the EmQue total score.   
Early Self-Concept. The SUQ had significant positive correlations with later false-
belief understanding, the TEC, and the Prosocial Story Task. Only correlations with false-
belief understanding and the Prosocial Story Task remained after controlling for the MCDI rs 
(50) = .31, p = .024 and the MS Checklist rs (50) = .42, p = .002. The SUQ was not 
significantly correlated with the later blanket task or later EmQue. 
Early Parent Reports of Empathy. Early empathy, as measured by the early EmQue 
was positively correlated with children’s later scores on the TEC, the Prosocial Story Task, 
the EmQue Attention to Others’ Feelings factor and the EmQue total score. The latter three 
correlations remained significant after controlling for the MCDI and MS Checklist, rs (50) = 
.36, p = .009, rs (50) = .29, p = .039, and rs (50) = .32, p = .021, respectively. Early EmQue 
scores were not correlated with later false-belief understanding, the blanket task, or the 
Emotion Contagion or Prosocial Action factors on the later EmQue.  
Early Instrumental and Empathic Helping. Child concern during early 
instrumental helping tasks was negatively correlated with the later blanket task and the 
Emotion Contagion factor and total score of the later EmQue. There were no further 
correlations between early instrumental helping and later social understanding, although a 
positive correlation between early instrumental helping promptness and later false-belief 
understanding was approaching significance (p = .055). Child concern during empathic 
helping tasks was positively correlated with later TEC performance but this did not remain 
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significant after controlling for the MCDI. No further significant associations were found 
between early empathic helping and later social understanding.  
Concurrent Relations between Later Child Social Understanding and Language  
Table 9 shows the correlations between child social understanding and language 
variables within the later time point. Correlational analyses showed that children’s age has 
significant positive correlations with their language ability, false-belief understanding, the 
TEC, and the Prosocial Story Task, and Prosocial Actions factor of the EmQue. Language 
ability was positively correlated with false-belief understanding, the TEC, and the Prosocial 
Story Task.  
Emotion understanding, measured by the TEC, was positively correlated with false-
belief understanding, and the Prosocial Story Task, but these correlations did not remain after 
controlling for language ability. The TEC was not significantly correlated with the blanket 
task or the EmQue. The blanket task was positively correlated with the Prosocial Actions 
factor of the EmQue and this correlation remained significant after controlling for language 
rs (49) = .33, p = .02. No further significant correlations were found within later time point 
social understanding variables.  
Regressions 
Regression analysis was conducted to examine the independent variance of each early 
correlate of later child social understanding variables. First the model is presented, then 
additional models are shown with R2 Change.  
First, I examined if children’s early self-concept could account for variance in their 
later false-belief understanding, independent of their early language ability (Table 10). The 
MCDI and MS Checklist were entered in the first step of the regression. Together, these 
variables accounted for 15.8% of variance in later false-belief understanding F = (2, 50) = 




Spearman’s Correlations between Early and Later Child Language and Social Understanding  
Later Variables 












MCDI .40** .35* -.11 .32* .12 -.03 .29* .16 .14 
MS Checklist  .43** .44** -.14 .33* .06 .03 .35** .20 .23 
EmQue .32* .14 .15 .37** .38** .20 .39** .24 .34* 
SUQ .62** .45** -.07 .39** .34* -.01 .16 .11 .09 
Instr Help Pr .04 .27 -.22 .25 .13 -.05 -.07 .03 -.09 
Emp Help Pr .10 .16 .08 .23 .05 -.05 -.01 .01 -.01 
Instr Help Cn .03 .17 -.29* -.03 -.14 -.38** -.12 -.23 -.34* 
Emp Help Cn .41** .18 -.11 .30* .19 -.19 -.13 -.10 -.19 
Instr Help Ds .08 .02 -.23 -.02 -.23 .10 .10 -.06 .09 
Emp Help Ds .11 -.05 -.07 -.03 -.10 .01 -.07 -.14 -.10 
Note: **p < 0.01 and *p < 0.05. All significance tests are two-tailed. MCDI stands for MacArthur Communicative Development Inventory, MS 
Checklist stands for Mental State Checklist, EmQue stands for Empathy Questionnaire, SUQ stands for UCLA Self-Understanding 
Questionnaire, Instr Help stands for instrumental helping task, Emp Help stands for empathic helping task, Pr stands for helping task 
promptness, Cn stands for helping task concern, Ds stands for helping task distress. CELF stands for Clinical Evaluations of Language 
Fundamentals, FB stands for false belief tasks, TEC stands for Test of Emotion Comprehension, Prosocial stands for Prosocial Story Task, 
EmQue stands for Empathy Questionnaire, EC stands for emotion contagion, AOF stands for attention to others’ feelings, PA stands for 





Spearman’s Correlations within Later Child Social Understanding and Language 
  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
1. Age (At later 
time point) 
- 
                  
2. CELF  .55** -                 
3. FB .31* .43** -               
4. Blanket Task .00 .06 -.24 -             
5. TEC .39** .48** .28* -.17 -           
6. Prosocial  .47** .40** .17 .06 .41** -         
7. EmQue EC .04 -.11 -.15 .20 -.18 .04 -       
8. EmQue AOF .03 .10 .05 .14 -.01 .14 .33* -     
9. EmQue PA .30* .05 -.18 .27* .08 .16 .33* .17 -   
10. EmQue 
Total 
.14 .01 -.12 .24 -.09 .14 .80** .67** .64** -  
Note: **p < 0.01 and *p < 0.05. All significance tests are two-tailed. CELF stands for Clinical Evaluations of Language Fundamentals, FB 
stands for false belief tasks, TEC stands for Test of Emotion Comprehension, Prosocial stands for Prosocial Story Task, EmQue stands for 




variance accounted for to 21.6%, F = (1, 49) = 3.65, p = .062. These results show there was 
no significant contribution of the SUQ over and above the effect of early language abilities, 
although it was approaching significance (p = .06). The residuals of the model were normally 
distributed W(53) = .956, p = .051.  
Table 10 
Summary of Hierarchical Regression Analysis for Variables Predicting Children’s Later 
False- Belief Understanding  
 B SE B β R² and ΔR² 
Model 1    .158 
MCDI 0.280 0.215 0.353  
MS Checklist 0.039 0.214 0.049  
Model 2    .058a 
MCDI 0.044 0.243 0.056  
MS Checklist -0.048 0.214 -0.060  
SUQ 0.045 0.023 0.465 ✝  
Note. MCDI stands for MacArthur Development Inventory, MS Checklist stands for Mental 
State Checklist, SUQ stands for UCLA Self-Understanding Questionnaire. All significance 
tests are two tailed.  
a R2 Change 
✝ p = .06 
Another regression analysis was conducted to examine whether early child language 
and social understanding variables were predictors of children’s later TEC scores (Table 11). 
The early language average, EmQue, SUQ, child concern during early empathic helping 
tasks, and child gender were entered into the regression. Together these variables accounted 
for 25.8% of the variance in TEC scores, F (5, 47) = 3.27, p = .013. None of the variables 
made significant independent contributions to the model. The residuals were normally 
distributed, W (53) = .97, p = .238. 
Table 11 
Summary of Regression Analysis for Child Social Understanding Variables Predicting 
Children’s Later TEC Scores 
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Note. Early Language MCDI stands for MacArthur Development Inventory, MS Checklist 
stands for Mental State Checklist, EmQue stands for Empathy Questionnaire, SUQ stands for 
UCLA Self-Understanding Questionnaire, Emp Help Cn stands for child concern during 
empathic helping task.  
 
Regression was also used to examine whether early child social understanding 
variables were predictors of later Prosocial Story Task scores (Table 12). The early EmQue, 
SUQ, and child gender were entered into the model. Together these variables accounted for 
28.1% of the variance in later Prosocial Story Task scores, F (3, 50) = 6.51, p = .001. Only 
gender made a significant independent contribution to later Prosocial Story Task scores. The 
residuals were normally distributed, W(54) = .98, p = .656.  
Table 12 
Summary of Regression Analysis for Child Social Understanding Variables Predicting 
Children’s Later Prosocial Story Task Scores 
Note. EmQue stands for Empathy Questionnaire, SUQ stands for UCLA Self-Understanding 
Questionnaire. **p < 0.01. All significance tests are two tailed.  
 
Regression was also used to examine potential predictors of children’s scores on the 
later EmQue Attention to Others’ Feelings Factor (Table 13). The MCDI and MS Checklist 
 B SE B β R² and ΔR² 
Model 1    .258 
Mean MCDI & MS 
Checklist  
0.02 0.48 0.01  
EmQue 0.02 0.06 0.05  
SUQ 0.07 0.06 0.29  
Emp Help Cn 1.68 1.03 0.22  
Gender 0.67 0.54 0.16  
 B SE B β R² and ΔR² 
Model 1    .281 
EmQue 0.21 0.12 0.25  
SUQ 0.04 0.08 0.07  
Gender 3.06 1.08 0.36**  
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were entered in the first step of the model. Together these variables accounted for 11.3% of 
variance, F (2, 51) = 3.24, p = .047. Next, children’s early EmQue total score was added to 
step two of the model. This increased the variance accounted for to 16.8%, F (1, 50) = 3.33, p 
= .074, showing that the early EmQue made no significant contribution to later EmQue 
Attention to Others’ Feelings over and above the effect of early child language. The residuals 
of the regression model were normally distributed, W (54) = .99, p = .852.  
Table 13 
Summary of Hierarchical Regression Analysis for Variables Predicting Children’s Later 
Attention to Others’ Feelings on the EmQue 
 B SE B β R² and ΔR² 
Model 1    .113 
MCDI 0.58 0.61 0.26  
MS Checklist 0.18 0.61 0.08  
Model 2    .055a 
MCDI 0.22 0.62 0.10  
MS Checklist 0.19 0.59 0.09  
EmQue Total 0.12 0.07 0.28  
Note. MCDI stands for MacArthur Development Inventory, MS Checklist stands for Mental 
State Checklist, EmQue stands for Empathy Questionnaire.  
a R2 Change 
Results Part II 
Analysis Plan 
To address the role of parent mental state talk in the relationship between empathy 
and theory of mind, several further analyses were conducted. First, data reductions were 
made. T-tests were used to assess the effects of social correlates on normally distributed 
parent mental state talk variables and Mann-Whitney tests were used to assess these effects 
on non-normal variables. Significant associations between early and later parent mental state 
talk variables and early and later child social understanding and language variables were then 
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examined using correlational analyses. Linear regressions were run to establish whether early 
parent mental state talk variables were key predictors of later child variables.  
The frequencies of parent mental state talk variables were converted into percentages 
by dividing the frequency of each book task variable by the total number of parent utterances 
in the task. This showed how many mental state utterances they made, relative to their total 
number of utterances during the task. Percentage variables were used in all analyses of parent 
mental state talk in the early and later book tasks to account for parent verbosity. For all 
parent mental state talk variables, outliers (+3 SDs from the mean) were adjusted by reducing 
them to the largest non-outlier. All variables were tested for normality and several were 
found to be skewed. In an attempt to normalise skewed data, square root transformations 
were made. This did not normalise the majority of the data however, and therefore non-
parametric tests were used, unless otherwise stated. When checking for the effects of social 
correlates t-tests were used for normally distributed variables and Mann-Whitney tests were 
used for non-normally distributed ones. When using t-tests homogeneity of variances were 
checked and where there were violations of homogeneity of variance degrees of freedom 
were adjusted for. Greenhouse Geisser was used in analyses of variance.  
Data Reduction  
Mental state variables from the book task were combined to form three levels of 
mental state content and two levels of referent. A total desires variable was formed by 
combining genuine desires and desire directives. A total emotions variable was formed by 
combining physical state emotions and emotions, and a total cognitions variable was formed 
by combining thoughts, knowledge, and other cognitions. A total mental state talk variable 
was formed by combining the total desires, total emotions, and total cognitions variables. 
Two of the referent variables were combined as they did not correlate with other variables 
independently. These were references to self (the parent) and references to others. This joint 
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category is hereafter referred to as references to others. The two final categories of referent 
are therefore references to the child and references to others.  
The data for parents’ early mental state talk was reduced to 53 participants due to 
missing data for two participants in the early time points. Subsequent analyses involving 
early parent mental state talk therefore only include 53 children. Data for parents’ later 
mental state talk was reduced to 54 participants due to a recording error in the book task for 
one participant, so subsequent analyses involving later parent mental state talk only include 
54 children.  
Preliminary Analyses 
Socio-Economic Status 
Socio-economic status had no significant correlations with early parent mental state 
references (ps range = .276 - .938). It had significant positive correlations with parents’ later 
total references to child mental states rs (53) = .35, p = .011, and their references to 
cognitions across referents rs (53) = .33, p = .016. Socio-economic status had no significant 
correlations with later parent mental state references to others, or to desires or emotions 
across referents (ps range = .145 - .481).  
Location 
A significant effect of location was found for parents’ total references to others’ 
mental states t (52) = 2.22, p = .031, their references to emotions across referents t (17.117) = 
6.22, p = >.001, and their references to desires across referents t (52) = 2.91, p = .005. They 
used more mental state talk at the university. There was no effect of location on their 
references to child mental states, or cognitions across referents (ps range = .179 - .235).  
Gender 
At the early time point gender differences favouring females were found for parents’ 
total mental state references to others, t (51) = -2.64, p = .011, for their total mental state 
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references to their child, t (51) = -2.65, p = .011, and for their references to cognitions across 
referents, t (51) = -2.37, p = .022. At the later time point a gender difference favouring males 
was found for parents’ total references to cognitions across referents, t (52) = -2.24, p = .030. 
Gender was included as a covariate in further analyses including these measures. No gender 
differences were found for parents’ references to desires or emotion across referents at the 
early time point (ps range = .331 - .486). No gender differences were found for parents’ total 
references to child mental states, the mental states of others, or to emotions, desires, or 
cognitions across referents at the later time point (ps range = .084 - .695).  
Siblings 
At the early time point there was an effect of having older siblings on parents’ total 
references to emotions t (50) = -2.19, p = .033. Parents used more emotions terms when the 
child had an older sibling. There was no effect of having older siblings on parents early 
references to the mental states of others, the child, or their references to desires and 
cognitions across referents (ps range = .160 - .859). At the later time point there was no effect 
of having older siblings on parents total mental state references across referents or mental 
state content (ps range = .164 - .828) 
Main Analyses 
Descriptives 
The raw data from the book task gave frequencies of parents’ mental state utterances 
categorised by content and referent. At the early time point, parents made a mean of 78.5 
utterances (range 31-111) during the book task, with a mean of 16.5 mental state utterances 
(range 4-41) and 56.4 non mental state utterances (range 21-99). At the later time point 
parents made a mean of 97.5 total utterances (range 24-201), with a mean of 38.8 mental state 
utterances (range 4-92) and 68.5 (20-132) non mental state utterances.  
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Descriptive statistics for early and later mental state talk categorised by content and 
referent, and non-mental state talk are presented in Table 14. All descriptives are presented as 
percentage scores.  
Table 14 
Descriptive Statistics for Percentages of Early and Later Parent Mental State Utterances by 
Content and Referent, and Non-Mental State Utterances in the Book Task 
 
Parent Mental 
State Utterances  
Early Time Point Later Time Point 
 M SD Range M SD Range 
Other desires 0.8 1.2 0-7 2.2 1.9 0-9.3 
Other emotions 8.6 5.8 1.7-28.4 6.7 3.7 0-14.9 
Other cognitions 3.5 3.5 0-13.6 13.2 8.4 1.7-43.2 
Other MST total 12.9 8.6 2.6-39.8 22.1 10.5 6.6-56.8 
Child desires 2.7 2.2 0-8.8 2.3 2.3 0-11.2 
Child emotions 0.2 0.4 0-1.8 0.5 0.8 0-3.7 
Child cognitions 2.6 3.0 0-12.3 14.0 6.9 1.2-26.9 
Child MST Total 5.5 3.8 0-16.5 16.9 7.7 3.6-37.1 
Desires total 4.1 2.6 0-14.4 4.5 2.8 0-11.2 
Emotions total 9.9 5.0 1.2-22.9 7.3 3.9 0-16.5 
Cognitions total 6.8 6.6 0-36.6 27.3 12.7 4.3-56.8 
MST total 20.9 9.7 5.2-57.7 39.0 14.7 13-73 
NMST total 71.8 8.2 54.2-89.2 71.1 10.1 52-91.3 
Note. MST stands for mental state talk, NMST stands for non-mental state talk.  
 
Main and Interaction Effects of Parent Mental State Talk Analyses of Variance 
Parent mental state talk in the book task was categorised by content, referent and time. 
A 3 mental state talk (desire, emotion, cognition) x 2 referent (other, child) x 2 time point 
(early/later) analysis of variance (ANOVA) with all factors as within-subjects was performed. 
Paired t-tests were used to assess the direction of main effects and any interactions. There 
were significant main effects of mental state content (F = 121.58, p < .001), referent (F = 
4.70, p = .035), and time (F = 251.66, p < .001). Parents used more emotion terms at the early 
time point and more cognition terms at the later time point (Table 14). They referred to others 
most at both time points, and overall their mental state talk increased over time.  
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Significant interactions were also observed between the content and referent of 
parents’ mental state talk (F = 229.81, p < .001), the content and time point (F = 110.29, p < 
.001), and the referent and time point (F = 43.92, p < .001). There was also a significant 
three-way interaction between the content, referent, and time point (F = 98.10, p < .001). 
To explore these interactions, paired t-tests showed that at the early time point, 
parents made references to the mental states of others significantly more than those of the 
child, t (52) = 7.94, p < .001. Surprisingly, at the early time point, parents were found to use 
emotion terms significantly more than desire terms or cognition terms, t (52) = -7.78, p < 
.001 and t (52) = 4.67, p < .001 respectively. Cognition terms were used more frequently than 
desire terms, t (52) = -2.44, p = .018, meaning desire terms were used the least.  
Figure 1 shows the interaction between mental state content and referent at the early 
time point. Paired t-tests found that of the emotion terms used at the early time point, parents 
used significantly more in reference to others, than in reference to the child, t (52) = 20.95, p 
< .001. Similarly, their use of cognition terms was significantly greater when referencing 
others, t (52) = 2.67, p = .010. By contrast, parents made significantly more references to the 





Mental State Content by Referent at the Early Time Point 
In contrast to the early time point, at the later time point parents made significantly 
more references to the mental states of the child, than those of others, t (53) = -12.20, p < 
.001. Of the mental state terms used at the later time point, parents used cognition terms 
significantly more than they used emotion terms or desires terms, t (53) = -12.04, p < .001 
and t (53) = -12.98, p < .001, respectively. They used emotion terms more than desire terms, t 
(53) = 4.38, p < .001, meaning that desire terms were again used least frequently.  
Figure 2 shows the interaction between mental state content and referent at the later 
time point. Paired t-tests found that parents continued to use emotion terms in reference to 
others significantly more than in reference to the child, t (52) = 12.89, p < .001. Their use of 
cognition terms had changed between the early and later time point however. At the later time 
point parents used cognition terms in reference to the child, significantly more than they did 
in reference to others, t (52) = -11.96, p < .001. Their use of desire terms at the later time 
point was found to be similar across referents with no significant differences between 




Mental State Content by Referent at the Later Time Point 
 
Overall, parents made significantly more mental state utterances at the later time point 
than at the early time point t (52) = -17.36, p < .001, using significantly more desire terms, t 
(52) = -6.52, p < .001, emotion terms, t (52) = -3.10, p < .001, and cognition terms t (52) = -
14.76, p < .001, at the later time point.  
Longitudinal Relations between Early Parent Mental State Talk and Later Child Social 
Understanding  
Correlational analyses showed that early parent mental state talk had significant 
associations with later social understanding (Table 15). First, parents’ early references to their 
child’s emotions was positively correlated with later performance on the Prosocial Story 
Task. Second, their early references to child cognitions were positively correlated with 
performance on the later Prosocial Story Task and TEC. Finally, while parents’ references to 
emotions were not significantly correlated with the TEC at the referent level, their total use of 
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emotion terms was significantly, positively correlated with the TEC. Interestingly, parents’ 
early references to their child’s desires, were negatively correlated with the later blanket task.  
Longitudinal Relations between Early Child Social Understanding and Later Parent 
Mental State Talk 
Several early child variables were significantly correlated with later parent mental 
state talk (Table 16). The SUQ had positive correlations with parents’ later use of cognition 
terms when referencing the child, and when referencing others, but these correlations did not 
remain significant when controlling for the MCDI. Of the early helping task variables, only 
child concern during the instrumental helping tasks, and child distress during the empathic 
helping tasks were significantly associated with parent mental state talk in the later book task. 
Both of these early child variables were positively correlated with parents’ later use of 
emotions terms when referencing others. The early EmQue had no significant correlations 
with later parent mental state talk.   
Concurrent Relations between Later Child Social Understanding and Language and 
Parent Mental State Talk 
Later child social understanding variables had several significant associations with 
later parent mental state language variables (Table 17). First, false-belief understanding and 
the TEC were positively and independently correlated with parents’ references to child 
cognitions, and to those of others. Second, children’s prosocial story scores were positively 
correlated with parents’ references to child cognitions. However, these correlations did not 
remain significant after controlling for children’s later general language ability. No further 
correlations were found between later child social understanding variables and later parent 




Regression analyses were conducted to examine potential predictors of later child 
social understanding. First the model is presented, then additional models are shown with R2 
Change. When early parent mental state talk variables are entered into models as predictors, 
referent and content total variables have not been included where possible to minimise 
overlap. Where early child social understanding and/or language variables had not been 
found to make significant independent contributions to later social understanding variables in 
previous regressions, these were not included in the models. 
To examine whether parent mental state talk could account for variance in TEC scores 
another regression was conducted (Table 18). Parents’ references to child cognitions, parents’ 
total references to emotions, and child gender were entered into the model. Together these 
variables accounted for 23.7% of the variance in TEC scores F(3, 48) = 4.97, p = .004. Only 




Spearman’s Correlations between Early Parent Mental State Language and Later Child Social Understanding and Language  
Later Variables 












Other Desires .04 -.12 .06 -.14 -.11 .04 -.04 .08 .05 
Other Emotions .05 .20 .06 .19 -.05 -.04 -.16 .04 -.13 
Other Cognitions .23 .22 .00 .15 .09 -.21 -.10 .09 -.17 
Other MST Total .14 .21 .01 .19 .02 -.10 -.17 .09 -.15 
Child Desires -.23 -.02 -.32* -.03 -.07 .15 -.25 .04 .03 
Child Emotions .20 .21 .11 .18 .30* .09 .00 -.05 .02 
Child Cognitions .36** .22 -.26 .45** .28* -.22 .04 .18 -.05 
Child MST Total .18 .27 -.35* .31* .14 -.14 -.12 .16 -.06 
Desires Total -.26 -.15 -.16 -.14 -.05 .16 -.12 .06 .12 
Emotions Total .07 .17 .05 .28* .09 -.10 -.03 .04 -.11 
Cognitions Total .34* .22 -.06 .30* .20 -.26 .02 .17 -.11 
MST Total .22 .21 -.07 .33* .19 -.22 -.02 .17 -.11 
Note: **p < 0.01 and *p < 0.05. All significance tests are two-tailed. MST stands for mental state talk. CELF stands for Clinical Evaluations of 
Language Fundamentals, FB stands for false belief tasks, TEC stands for Test of Emotion Comprehension, Prosocial stands for prosocial story 
task, EmQue stands for Empathy Questionnaire, EC stands for emotion contagion, AOF stands for attention to others’ feelings, PA stands for 


































MCDI .17 -.15 .28* .18 .01 .00 .24 .23 -.15 .12 .24 .21 
MS 
Checklist 
.21 -.11 .19 .15 -.02 -.03 .20 .18 -.13 .08 .17 .14 
EmQue .02 -.04 .15 .07 .19 -.05 .07 .09 -.08 .15 .10 .09 
SUQ .01 -.05 .30* .18 .13 .10 .28* .30* -.04 .12 .30* .26 
Instr Help Pr .05 .22 .07 .13 .22 -.18 -.04 -.02 .19 .19 .03 .11 
Emp Help 
Pr 
.15 .20 .01 .11 .02 -.09 .13 .15 .18 .15 .03 .13 
Instr Help 
Cn 
-.06 .28* .04 .12 .13 .19 -.07 -.03 .30* .07 .01 .09 
Emp Help 
Cn 
.01 .17 .25 .23 -.10 -.06 .08 .04 .15 .00 .20 .19 
Instr Help 
Ds 
.05 .15 .07 .07 -.16 -.08 .11 .09 .13 -.10 .12 .11 
Emp Help 
Ds 
.00 .35* .08 .19 .07 .05 .01 .04 .34* -.02 .09 .14 
Note: **p < 0.01 and *p < 0.05. All significance tests are two-tailed. MCDI stands for MacArthur Communicative Development Inventory, MS 
Checklist stands for Mental State Checklist, EmQue stands for Empathy Questionnaire, SUQ stands for UCLA Self-Understanding 
Questionnaire, Instr Help stands for instrumental helping task, Emp Help stands for empathic helping task, Pr stands for helping task 





Spearman’s Correlations within Later Parent Mental State Language and Later Child Social Understanding and Language  












Other Desires -.06 .06 .05 .15 -.09 -.13 -.02 .10 .13 .08 
Other Emotions -.11 -.08 .20 -.16 -.01 -.07 -.21 -.05 -.16 -.21 
Other 
Cognitions 
.11 .472** .32* .05 .34* .20 -.12 .12 .02 -.01 
Other MST 
Total 
.01 .293* .34* -.03 .20 .06 -.17 .05 -.03 -.09 
Child Desires -.17 -.07 -.03 .14 -.03 .15 .23 -.01 -.14 .06 
Child Emotions -.02 .27 .14 -.03 .19 .18 -.01 -.04 -.08 -.09 
Child 
Cognitions 
.27* .54** .33* -.03 .32* .31* -.22 .02 .07 -.04 
Child MST .21 .52** .28* .00 .28* .33* -.13 .01 .04 -.01 
Emotions Total -.14 -.02 .22 -.16 .02 -.03 -.21 -.07 -.18 -.23 
Desires Total -.20 -.05 .00 .13 -.08 .07 .13 -.03 -.04 .04 
Cognitions Total .20 .59** .35* .00 .40** .29* -.23 .02 .00 -.09 
MST Total .08 .48** .34* -.02 .34* .23 -.25 -.01 -.03 -.14 
Note: **p < 0.01 and *p < 0.05. All significance tests are two-tailed. MST stands for mental state talk. CELF stands for Clinical Evaluations of 
Language Fundamentals, ToM stands for theory of mind, TEC stands for Test of Emotion Comprehension, Prosocial stands for prosocial story 
task, EmQue stands for Empathy Questionnaire, EC stands for emotion contagion, AOF stands for attention to others’ feelings, PA stands for 
prosocial actions.  
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variance in TEC scores, over and above the effect of the other variables. The residuals were 
normally distributed W(52) = .98, p = .633.  
Table 18 
Summary of Regression Analysis for Variables Predicting Children’s Later TEC Scores 
 B SE B β R² and ΔR² 
Model 1    .237 
Child Cognitions .177 .087 .278*  
Emotions Total .478 .304 .201  
Gender .864 .532 .220  
Note. *p < 0.05. All significance tests are two tailed.  
In a second regression investigating whether early parent mental state talk could 
account for variance in later Prosocial Story Task scores, I entered parents’ early references 
to child emotions, their early references to child cognitions, and child gender into the model 
(Table 19). Together these variables accounted for 27.8% of variance in children’s Prosocial 
Story Task scores F(3, 49) = 6.29, p = .001. Both parents’ early references to child emotions 
and child gender made significant independent contributions to variance in later scores on the 
Prosocial Story Task over and above the effect of the other variables. The residuals were 
normally distributed W(53) = .99, p = .783.  
Table 19 
Summary of Regression Analysis for Variables Predicting Children’s Later Prosocial Story 
Task Scores 
 B SE B β R² and ΔR² 
Model 1    .278 
Child Emotions 2.765 1.342 .252*  
Child Cognitions .212 .178 .155  
Gender 3.091 1.084 .372**  





Results Part III 
Mediation Analyses 
Mediation analyses were used to investigate the indirect effects of parent mental state 
talk on child social understanding. First, analyses examined the indirect effects of early 
parent talk on later child social understanding. Next, analyses examined the indirect effects of 
parent mental state talk on child social understanding within the later time point. For each 
mediation analysis unstandardised indirect effects were computed for each of the 5,000 
bootstrapped samples, and the 95% confidence interval was computed using the PROCESS 
procedure in SPSS (Hayes, 2017). In order to do a mediation analysis, a simple association 
between X and Y is not a required precondition (Hayes, 2017). 
Given parents’ early references to child cognitions independently predicted later TEC 
scores, a mediation analysis was used to investigate whether early references to child 
cognitions predicted later false-belief understanding, via emotion understanding. Recall that 
later TEC scores were positively correlated with later false-belief understanding. A mediation 
analysis was constructed with parents’ early references to child cognitions as the predictor 
(X), later TEC scores as the mediator (M), and later false-belief understanding as the outcome 
(Y). The standardised MCDI and MS Checklist scores were covariates. No significant 
indirect effect was found, 95% CI [-0.012, 0.038].  
Another mediation analysis was used to investigate whether parents’ early references 
to child emotions had an indirect effect on later emotion understanding, via later prosociality. 
Recall that parents’ early references to child emotions independently predicted later Prosocial 
Story Task scores, and these scores were significantly correlated with later TEC scores. In the 
analysis parents’ early references to child emotions was the predictor (X), the Prosocial Story 
Task was the mediator (M), the TEC was the outcome (Y), and the standardised MCDI and 
MS Checklist scores were covariates. A significant indirect effect was found with a point 
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estimate of 0.48, SE = .35, and the 95% confidence interval ranged from 0.027 to 1.372. Thus 
the indirect effect was statistically significant. The regression coefficient between parents’ 
early references to child emotions and the Prosocial Story Task was statistically significant 
(2.84), as was the regression coefficient between the Prosocial Story Task and the TEC (0.17) 
(Figure 3). The direction of the estimates in each pathway indicate that children of parents 
who made more references to emotions, demonstrated greater prosociality, and in turn, 
showed better emotion understanding.  
A third mediation analysis was used to investigate whether parents’ later references to 
child cognitions had an indirect effect on children’s later false-belief understanding, via 
children’s later language. Recall that parents’ later references to child cognitions were 
significantly correlated with children’s later language ability, and both were correlated with 
later false-belief understanding. Parents’ references to child cognitions was the predictor (X), 
children’s later language ability was the mediator (M), later false-belief understanding was 
the outcome (Y), and SES was a covariate. A significant indirect effect was found with a 
point estimate of .03, SE = .02, and the 95% confidence interval ranged from 0.007 to 0.070. 
Thus the indirect effect was statistically significant. The regression coefficient between 
parents’ references to child cognitions and children’s language was statistically significant 
(.08), as was the regression coefficient between children’s language and false-belief 
understanding (.39) (Figure 4). The direction of the estimates in each pathway indicate that 
children of parents who made more references to cognitions had  better language ability, 
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Figure 4 
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Discussion 
Theory of mind describes the ability to understand the mental states of others, and to 
use this knowledge to predict behaviour. While a significant amount of research has been 
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dedicated to understanding the development of theory of mind, and this has primarily focused 
on its relation to developmental constructs such as language, self-concept, and emotion 
understanding. The literature on the role of empathy in theory of mind development is scarce, 
with only a handful of studies considering the link between prosociality, an indicator of 
empathy, and theory of mind. In considering the developmental of theory of mind, various 
social correlates must be accounted for. Previous research suggests that the amount of mental 
state terms that a parent uses, socio-economic status, the number of older siblings a child has, 
and gender can influence theory of mind. The overarching aims of this study were to 
investigate the relationship between empathy and theory of mind, and to determine the role of 
parent mental state talk in the relationship. The study yielded four main findings. First, early 
empathy was not related to later theory of mind. Second, there was no concurrent association 
between empathy and theory of mind at the later time point. Third, a mediation effect of 
parent mental state talk on an association between early empathy and later theory of mind 
could not be examined, and fourth, both later empathy and later theory of mind were 
associated with later parent mental state talk.  
The first goal of this study was to investigate whether early empathy predicted later 
theory of mind. Past research suggests that emotion understanding, a prerequisite of empathy, 
precedes and facilitates false-belief understanding (Bartsch & Estes, 1996; Bartsch & 
Wellman, 1995). It is posited that children recognise and understand emotions prior to other 
mental states due to their salient nature. Emotion understanding prompts them to consider 
how emotions may differ between people, which then leads them to consider more complex 
mental states and how these can also differ. Given empathy is an extension of emotion 
understanding, it was hypothesised that children’s ability to recognise and experience others’ 
emotions also emerges prior to their ability to understand others’ more complex mental states, 
and that this experience informs subsequent theory of mind development.  
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Surprisingly, data from the current study showed that early empathy was not related to 
later false-belief understanding. One explanation for this finding may be that false-belief 
understanding precedes empathy development. Children may require an understanding of 
others’ beliefs, including when they differ to their own, in order to understand another 
person’s emotional reaction to a situation and to experience an emotional response 
themselves. This would be consistent with cross-sectional studies that found children 
understood others’ beliefs and desires before they understood others’ emotions (Bradmetz & 
Schneider, 1999; De Rosnay et al., 2004; Hadwin & Perner, 1991). Additionally when 
prosociality is considered as an indicator of empathy, these findings are consistent with the 
mediation effect found by Ornaghi et al. (2016). They found false-belief understanding 
mediated the association between emotion understanding and prosociality, although this was 
a concurrent association and therefore differs slightly to the hypothesis at hand. If it were the 
case that false-belief understanding precedes empathy, we would expect empathy and false-
belief understanding to be associated at the later time point.  In support of empathy preceding 
false-belief understanding, Aitken et al. (2020) found that children demonstrated empathic 
helping behaviour prior to 24-months-old which is earlier than children typically demonstrate 
false-belief understanding. A second explanation for the current finding is that empathy and 
false-belief understanding are unrelated constructs that develop independently of one another. 
As Cutting and Dunn (1999) found with emotion understanding, empathy too may develop 
independently of false-belief understanding. In this case we would not expect to see an 
association between empathy and false-belief understanding at the later time point.  
The second goal of this study was to determine whether empathy and theory of mind 
were associated at the later time point. In line with the hypothesis that early empathy would 
predict later theory of mind, it was expected that empathy and false-belief understanding 
would be related at the later time point. Also informing this hypothesis was evidence that 
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empathy emerges by age four (Rieffe et al., 2010), and the passing of false-belief tasks occurs 
from age four (Wellman et al., 2001), so we expected these skills to be apparent in our 
sample of children whose average age was 4.6. The results failed to confirm this hypothesis, 
suggesting that empathy and theory of mind develop independently of one another. As 
Cutting and Dunn (1999) found regarding emotion understanding and theory of mind, it 
appears that empathy and theory of mind develop concurrently, but are causally unrelated.  
The third goal of the study was to investigate whether parent mental state talk 
mediated the relationship between early empathy and later theory of mind. Past research has 
shown that parents adapt the mental state language they use in interactions with their child, 
according to the child’s understanding of mental states. Taumoepeau and Ruffman (2006) 
suggested that parents initially use desire terms while infant’s goals are most salient, before 
increasing their use of cognition terms as the child develops an awareness of knowledge and 
beliefs. It was hypothesised in the current study, that parents would adapt their mental state 
talk in response to their child’s empathy, scaffolding their developing theory of mind in the 
‘zone of proximal development’ (Fernyhough, 1996; Meins et al., 2002). In the current study, 
parents’ later references to child and other cognitions were positively correlated with later 
false-belief understanding, but parents’ early mental state talk was not. Furthermore, early 
empathy was not correlated with parents’ later references to cognitions, meaning a mediation 
analysis could not be conducted.  
While the correlation between parents’ references to cognitions and false-belief 
understanding at the later time point is consistent with past research (Ruffman et al., 2002), it 
was surprising to find that early mental state talk was not correlated with later false-belief 
understanding. One explanation for this finding may be related to the measure of parent 
mental state talk. In the current study at the early time point parents were only given 5-
minutes to do the book task in. In contrast, in Ruffman et al.’s study and at the later time 
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point in the current study, no time limit was imposed, allowing parents to go through the 
pictures at their desired pace. The time limit may have restricted how much parents said 
about each picture, and they may have focused on describing superficial details of the picture, 
rather engaging in deeper dialogues about the mental states of those depicted. Another 
unexpected finding was that early empathy was not correlated with parents’ later references 
to cognitions. While research has not focused on the association between early empathy and 
later references to cognitions specifically, the literature does suggest that parents increase the 
complexity of their mental state language as the child’s emotion understanding develops, 
shifting from talk of desires and emotions to those of cognitions (Taumoepeau & Ruffman, 
2006, 2008). If empathy were to develop soon after emotion understanding, we would expect 
to see a similar pattern whereby increasing early empathy would be associated with 
increasing later talk of cognitions. A potential explanation for this finding, consistent with a 
previous finding from the current study, is that empathy does not develop soon after emotion 
understanding and therefore parents do not scaffold their use of cognitive terms off of child 
empathy.  
The fourth and final goal of this study was to test whether parent mental state talk, 
empathy, and theory of mind were associated at 3-6 years. As discussed above, the overlap in 
skills required for both empathy and theory of mind, and the developmental trajectories for 
each meant it was hypothesised that the two would be associated at ages 3-6, but this was not 
confirmed in the current study. With regard to theory of mind and parent mental state talk, 
past literature suggests that parents adapt their mental state language as their child matures. It 
is argued that parents’ use of cognitive terms increases in the preschool years and supports an 
emerging theory of mind by encouraging them to first reflect on their own knowledge and 
beliefs, and then to consider those of others (Ruffman et al., 2002; Taumoepeau & Ruffman, 
2006, 2008).  
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The current study found that parents’ references to child and others’ cognitions were 
positively correlated with false-belief understanding at the later time point. This finding is 
consistent with previous literature, although the results leave open the direction of the effect: 
parents’ use of cognitive terms may facilitate false-belief understanding by encouraging 
children to consider their own and others’ beliefs and knowledge, parents may increase their 
use of cognitive terms in response to their child’s developing false-belief understanding, or 
the two may be unrelated, but driven by some third variable.  
It was also hypothesised that later empathy would be correlated with later parent 
mental state talk. This hypothesis was informed by findings that children of parents who used 
more mental state talk, were more likely to demonstrate prosocial behaviours, indicative of 
empathy (Drummond et al., 2014; Ruffman et al., 2006). No correlation was found between 
the EmQue, the parent reported measure of later empathy, and later parent mental state talk. 
This was surprising, given the number of studies that have shown both emotion 
understanding and prosociality, an indicator of empathy, to be related to parent mental state 
talk (Aitken, 2019; Drummond et al., 2014; Ensor et al., 2011; Taumoepeau & Ruffman, 
2006, 2008). While there may in fact be no association between the two, there are some 
important considerations to be made when interpreting results of the EmQue. First, an 
increasing total score on the EmQue may not reflect increasing empathy. A younger child is 
likely to score highly on the emotion contagion factor as this assesses the earliest form of 
empathy, whereas an older child is likely to obtain a low score on this factor and a higher 
score the attention to others’ feelings and/or the prosocial actions factors that assesses more 
mature empathy. The factor totals of the EmQue are therefore more useful in analyses. 
Surprisingly, none of the factors were correlated with later parent mental state talk either. 
Further explanation may be that the EmQue relies on parent report of a child’s reactions to 
and interactions with others which may impact the validity of the measure. Studies have 
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found low to moderate correspondence between informants on measures of child behaviour, 
primarily because child behaviour tends to differ across contexts (De Los Reyes et al., 2015). 
Parents’ observations of child behaviour in the current study are likely restricted to the home 
environment and therefore may not adequately represent their behaviour across contexts.  
In addition to the EmQue, the blanket task and the Prosocial Story Task were 
indicators of empathy at the later time point. When interpreting these measures it must be 
noted that these are measures of prosociality which not only require empathy, but also require 
one to act on empathy with the intention of benefiting another person. The blanket task was 
not correlated with later parent mental state talk. This too is inconsistent with findings that 
suggest a positive association between parent mental state talk and prosociality (Aitken, 
2019; Drummond et al., 2014; Ensor et al., 2011). While methodological issues could also be 
at play in the blanket task, a positive correlation was actually observed between it, and the 
prosocial actions factor on the later EmQue supporting the validity of both measures.  
On the other later measure of prosociality, the Prosocial Story Task, a positive 
correlation was found with parents’ later references to child cognitions. This supports the 
literature that found parent mental state talk and prosociality to be correlated (Aitken, 2019; 
Drummond et al., 2014; Ensor et al., 2011), although past literature has found parents’ 
references to emotions to be correlated with prosociality, rather than their references to 
cognitions. It may be that while early talk of emotions is important in the development of 
empathy and prosociality (Findlay et al., 2006; Nichols et al., 2009), parents’ use of emotions 
terms had stabilised by the later time point while their use of cognition terms continued to 
increase. This is consistent with Taumoepeau and Ruffman (2008) finding that parents’ use of 
desire and emotion terms plateau from around 33 month, while cognition terms continue to 
increase. Given that acting prosocially requires children to hold a developed self-concept and 
to take the perspectives of others, it makes sense that prosocial behaviours increase alongside 
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parents’ references to cognitions. The fact that these were references to child cognitions 
specifically suggests that children who are better supported in considering their own 
cognitions, are then better able to consider those of others in order to act prosocially.   
In addition to the findings pertaining to the research questions, the current study has 
yielded a number of interesting supplementary findings related to theory of mind 
development, parents’ use of mental state talk, and to the development of social 
understanding more broadly. First, with regard to theory of mind, analyses revealed an 
indirect effect of parents’ later references to children’s cognitions on later false-belief 
understanding, via later child language ability. This indicates that children of parents who 
made more references to their child’s cognitions have better language ability, which then 
leads to greater success on false-belief tasks. This finding supports research that suggests 
parent mental state talk is important in the development of general child language ability 
(Tompkins et al., 2018), as well as findings that have shown child language ability to predict 
theory of mind (Astington & Jenkins, 1999; De Villiers & Pyers, 2002; Milligan et al., 2007; 
Ruffman et al., 2003). As Tompkins et al. (2018) suggested, it appears that exposure to 
parents’ references to cognitions supports language development through understanding of 
semantics and sentential complements which then inform theory of mind. These features of 
language allow children to consider the meaning of mental state terms using their knowledge 
of language as a framework (Ruffman, 2014). Furthermore, consistent with the notion of 
parents’ references to the child scaffolding social understanding (Taumoepeau & Ruffman, 
2006, 2008), it appears that parents’ discussion of the child’s mental states is most useful in 
their developing language. As Taumoepeau and Ruffman (2006) suggested, this may be 
because referring to the child’s mental states helps make their implicit understanding explicit.  
It is worth noting another finding relating to theory of mind development. While no 
significant independent predictors of later false-belief understanding were found within the 
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early time point data, early self-concept was approaching significance. Had this been 
significant, it would have supported previous literature that posits self- and other-awareness 
as necessary prerequisites for the ability to take the perspectives of others (Moore, 2007).  
Gender, older siblings, and SES were examined as social correlates of false-belief 
understanding. Results showed no significant gender differences for false-belief 
understanding at the later time point. Some earlier work suggests the presence of a gender 
difference favouring females (Bosacki & Wilde Astington, 1999; Calero et al., 2013; 
Charman et al., 2002; Devine & Hughes, 2013; Walker, 2005), however the current study 
supports the findings which indicate no gender advantage for false-belief understanding 
(Hughes & Cutting, 1999; Hughes et al., 2011). Given the mixed findings in this area, further 
research is necessary.  
Considerable literature suggests that having siblings, or more specifically having 
older siblings is positively associated with a child’s theory of mind development (Dunn, 
1994; Dunn et al., 1991; Lewis et al., 1996; Perner et al., 1994; Ruffman et al., 1998). Some 
studies however have failed to confirm this positive association (Jenkins & Astington, 1996; 
Shahaeian, 2015). No effect of older siblings on false-belief understanding was found in the 
current study, providing support for studies that did not find an effect. Given several studies 
have found an effect of the total number of siblings, it may have been useful to consider both 
older and younger siblings in the current study.   
Unexpectedly, SES was not shown to be associated with false-belief understanding. 
This finding is inconsistent with previous studies that have found positive correlations (Cole 
& Mitchell, 1998; Cutting & Dunn, 1999). The literature suggests this occurs because either 
parents of low SES experience greater stress and are therefore less likely to use reasoning 
styles that promote insight into mental states, or because parents of higher SES talk to their 
children more, leading to better child language which in turn leads to earlier false-belief 
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understanding (Cole & Mitchell, 1998; Hoff-Ginsberg, 1998; Lillard, 2006). Given strong 
agreement within the literature, the findings in the current study may be best explained by 
methodological limitations. First, SES was measured by parent education at the early time 
point. It could have been beneficial to use a second measure of SES such a household 
income, and to reassess SES at the later time point to improve the validity of the measure. 
Second, the sample did not reflect a broad range of SES and the distribution was skewed 
towards a higher SES. Had the range of SES better reflected the general population, a 
significant association between SES and false-belief understanding may have been found. 
Results of the current study revealed several interesting findings regarding content 
and referent in the mental state talk used by parents in the book task. Based on the literature it 
was expected that parents would use more desire terms at the early time point and more 
cognition terms at the later time point. Taumoepeau and Ruffman (2006) argue that parents’ 
early mental state talk with infants is desire-based because infants’ early behaviours are 
largely goal-oriented. Taumoepeau and Ruffman (2008) found that by 33-months-old, 
parents’ use of desire and emotion terms had stabilised, while their use of cognition terms 
increased to facilitate increasingly complex social understanding. They also found that the 
child was initially the referent of parents’ mental state utterances more so than others were, 
but that this had changed by the later time point with parents then making more references to 
others. This too was explained using a social constructionist framework, with early references 
to the child’s mental states scaffolding their understanding of mental state terms by relating 
them to their own experiences, before encouraging them to consider the mental states of 
others.  
Parents’ use of mental state talk in the current study was largely inconsistent with 
Taumoepeau and Ruffman’s (2006, 2008) findings. First, at the early time point, parents used 
emotions terms the most, followed by cognition terms, using desire terms the least. 
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Furthermore, at this time point, parents made more references to the emotions and cognitions 
of others than they did to those of the child, only referencing the child more when using 
desire terms. While greater use of emotion terms than cognition terms is consistent with the 
literature, as is having more references to child desires than to other desires (Taumoepeau & 
Ruffman, 2006, 2008), the other findings are unexpected. Drummond et al. (2014) reported 
that parents are more likely to use desire terms in play-interaction tasks than book-interaction 
tasks, however given that Taumoepeau and Ruffman also used book tasks to measure mental 
state talk this provides little explanation. One more plausible explanation is that because the 
children in the current study had an average age of 20.5 months, parents had already begun to 
decrease their use of desire terms. Taumoepeau and Ruffman found that a decrease in desire 
terms had occurred from 15- to 24-months of age but did not assess parent mental state talk at 
20-months specifically, it is possible that there was a sharp decrease in use of desire terms 
soon after their first time point rather than a gradual decline.  
In considering parents’ references to child and other emotions, there are two points 
worth noting. First, in Taumoepeau and Ruffman’s (2006) study, they opted to exclude 
references to emotions from their by-referent analyses, as the majority of emotions terms 
referenced the emotions depicted in the pictures. Given the same book task was used, this 
may explain why parents made significantly more references to others’ emotions. Second, in 
the current study physical state emotions were included within the emotions mental state 
content category, whereas previous studies have tended to exclude these terms (Aitken, 2019; 
Taumoepeau & Ruffman, 2006). Physical state emotions are often depicted in the picture 
book task and thus this may have increased parents’ references to others’ emotions. Why 
parents were making more references to the cognitions of others than of the child still 
remains unclear, although one possibility is that by the nature of the category, there are a 
greater proportion of words that fit within it, and therefore a greater chance of parents using 
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words from this category. Taumoepeau and Ruffman separated out think and know terms 
from modulations of assertion, while the current study put all of these in cognitions content 
category.  
At the later time point in the current study, parents used more cognitive terms than 
emotion terms, and again used desire terms the least. They made more references to the 
child’s mental states than to those of others, specifically referencing child cognitions more 
than others’ cognitions, referencing others’ emotions more than child emotions, and 
referencing the desires of the child and others an equal amount. These later time point results 
are more consistent with the literature, but not without significant incongruences. First, the 
increased use of cognitions fits with the scaffolding hypothesis. Using fewer emotion terms 
and desire terms is expected given children likely have a fair understanding of emotions and 
desires by age 3-6. Second, the relationship between referents at the early and later time point 
has gone in the reverse direction to what Taumoepeau and Ruffman (2008) found. Based on 
their findings we would expect early mental state utterances to reference the child, while later 
mental state utterances reference others. Third, the findings at the content-by-referent level 
are mixed. Children may be competent in their understanding of desires by age 3-6 so it 
follows that parents have stopped adapting their desire talk to promote understanding at this 
age. It is unclear however, why parents made more references to the cognitions of the child 
than of others at the later time point. Overall parents made more mental state utterances at the 
later time point, and more references to each of the content categories at this time point also. 
Given children’s increased social understanding and language abilities, it fits that parents 
would use more mental state terms relative to non-mental state terms when children are older.   
Data from the current study also allowed for emotion understanding to be considered 
as an outcome variable. Of the early variables correlated with later emotion understanding, 
only parents’ early references to child cognitions was an independent predictor. Given 
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children’s were aged 20.5 months on average at the early time point, this finding is somewhat 
consistent, albeit a little earlier, with that of Taumoepeau and Ruffman (2008), who found 
that at 24 months, parents’ use of cognitions terms was the most stable predictor of later 
emotion understanding, whereas prior to this it was desire terms. This is consistent with the 
social constructivist theory and the scaffolding hypothesis which states that parents will adapt 
their mental state language to facilitate increasingly complex emotion understanding. By 
using cognitive terms, parents may encourage children to consider emotions that are 
influenced by others knowledge and beliefs but are not explicitly expressed. By referring to 
child cognitions specifically at the early time point, parents may support the child in 
considering their own beliefs before later emphasising the beliefs of others (Nichols & Stich, 
2003).  
In line with this, later child prosociality was found to mediate the association between 
parents’ early references to child emotions and later child emotion understanding. This 
suggests that parents’ talk of their child’s emotions supports the child being able to 
understand the emotions of others to the extent they are able to respond to them in a prosocial 
manner. Understanding prosociality and the effects on one’s actions on others’ emotions may 
in turn, inform more complex emotion understanding, such as an understanding of mixed 
emotions.   
While the main objective of the current study was to consider whether empathy was 
predictive of, and later concurrently associated with theory of mind, later child empathy was 
also considered as an outcome variable. While no early independent predictors of the later 
EmQue were found, results did show parents’ early references to child emotions and child 
gender to independently predict later performance on the Prosocial Story Task. This is 
interesting in the context of the past literature, given Brownell et al. (2013) found that only 
parents’ elicitation of emotion talk from their children was associated with later prosociality. 
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The current findings suggest that parents’ early mental state utterances also play a role in 
later prosociality. Consistent with Brownell et al.’s findings is the fact that parents’ talk of 
child emotions specifically was predictive of later prosociality. Greater early exposure to talk 
about the child’s own emotions may increase their understanding of emotions, allowing them 
to then understand others’ emotions and to later be more receptive to them. Within the later 
time point the association between parent mental state talk and child prosociality disappeared 
after controlling for child language ability, suggesting that language ability takes an 
increasingly important role in prosociality over time.  
In the current study, more advanced language may have helped children to better 
understand the stories and story endings in the Prosocial Story Task, as well as to better 
formulate their explanations for their chosen story endings. Some children may have held the 
implicit knowledge as to why a story ending was particularly prosocial, but struggled to 
express this in a way that qualified a 2-point answer. This supports Ornaghi et al.’s (2016) 
finding that child language ability mediated the association between emotion understanding 
and prosociality.  
Another measure of prosociality at the later time point was the blanket task. A 
negative correlation was found between this task and parents’ early references to desires. One 
explanation for this finding is that by only focusing on the child’s desires, parents are not 
encouraging them to think about the desires of others, and therefore not scaffolding the 
perspective taking that is required for prosociality. Brownell et al. (2013) pose a similar 
theory in relation to parents’ use of emotion terms. They stated that a focus on the emotions 
of others, rather than on those of the child, encourages the child to attend to, reflect on, and 
later demonstrate responsiveness to others’ emotions. Talk of desires likely functions in a 
similar way.  
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It was surprising that neither the Prosocial Actions factor of the later EmQue nor the 
blanket task were correlated with the Prosocial Story Task. It is possible that the high 
language demands of the Prosocial Story Task can explain this. Given that several items on 
the Prosocial Actions factor of the EmQue are similar to items on the Prosocial Story Task, it 
may be that children are able to demonstrate prosocial behaviours such as comforting a child 
in pain, but struggle to identify this behaviour and rationalise it in the task due to language 
limitations.  
With regard to gender and prosociality, the literature would suggest that girls are more 
likely to demonstrate prosocial behaviour in response to another’s emotional state, but not in 
response to situations where the helping is goal-directed and the other person is not 
emotionally affected (Fabes & Eisenberg, 1998). This was supported by the current study’s 
finding that gender independently predicted children’s scores on the Prosocial Story Task at 
age 3-6.  
Gender was found to have effects on the mental state talk parents used with their 
children at both time points. This is inconsistent with previous findings that have shown no 
gender differences in the content or referent of parent mental state talk (Jenkins et al., 2003; 
Taumoepeau & Ruffman, 2006). At the early time point gender differences favoured females 
with regard to parents’ mental state references to others, and to cognitions. In contrast, at the 
later time point there was a gender difference on parents’ total references to cognitions that 
favoured males. While there is no support for gender differences in mental state talk 
specifically, there is evidence to suggest that parents talk more to daughters than sons, and 
use more supportive speech with daughters (Leaper et al., 1998). Given the current study 
used broader categories of mental state content than previous studies have done, it may have 
captured more of this effect than previous studies. Why parents changed to using cognitions 
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terms more with boys at the later time point remains unclear and further research is required 
to clarify this effect.  
While this study has made an important contribution to the literature, it is important to 
acknowledge the limitations of the study. In addition to those previously discussed, another 
shortcoming of this study was its inability to determine the direction of several of the effects 
found. Because of the large time gap between the early and later time point, it was not 
possible to measure each construct at both time points. For example, false-belief tasks are too 
advanced for 20.5-month-olds and would have resulted in floor effects. Had there been a 
middle time point, when the children had an average age of 3-years-old, it may have been 
possible to administer tasks assessing constructs such as false belief, in turn allowing for the 
directions of longitudinal effects to be established. For example, given the association 
between parents’ references to cognitions and false-belief understanding at the later time 
point, a middle time point may have shown parents’ references to cognitions at age 3, to 
predict later false-belief understanding, as has been shown in previous research (Ruffman et 
al., 2003; Taumoepeau & Ruffman, 2008).  
The current study provides a novel contribution to the literature on the development 
of social understanding. The current study is the first, to our knowledge, to examine whether 
parent mental state talk mediates the longitudinal association between early empathy and later 
theory of mind. Surprisingly, and in contrast with previous studies, early empathy, including 
prosociality, was not found to be related to later false-belief understanding and thus no 
mediation effect was found. In addition to this contribution, the current study found an 
interesting mediation effect within the later time point. Children’s general language ability 
was found to mediate the association between parents’ references to cognitions and children’s 
false-belief understanding. Further research in this area is necessary to determine whether it is 
general language ability, or specific features of language that mediate this association. 
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Finally, this study also showed that later prosociality mediated the association between 
parents’ early references to child emotions and later child emotion understanding. To allow 
for the findings of the current study to be generalised, future studies should include 
participants from a wider range of socio-economic backgrounds. It is also recommended that 
multiple measures of empathy are used, rather than relying on parent-reported empathy and 
prosociality which is merely an indicator of empathy. Given empathy and theory of mind 
have been shown to be key in children’s social relationships and their ability to communicate 
with friends (Ensor et al., 2011; Hughes et al., 2011), the current study addresses an 
important area of development. The findings suggest that parent mental state talk and child 
general language ability are important in theory of mind development and could be the targets 
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The Foundations of Social Understanding  
INFORMATION SHEET FOR PARENTS and GUARDIANS 
 
Thank you for showing an interest in this project.  Please read this information 
sheet carefully before deciding whether or not to participate.  If you decide 
to participate we thank you.  If you decide not to take part there will be no 
disadvantage to you of any kind and we thank you for considering our 
request.   
 
What is the Aim of the Project? 
The focus of this project is on children’s social development, and how parents 
play a role in helping this development.    
 
What Type of Participants are being sought? 
We are seeking children who have previously participated in the Foundations 
of Social Understanding study to take part in this fifth time point.  
    
What will Participants Be Asked to Do? 
Should you agree to take part in this project, you and your child will be asked 
to: 
• Visit the Psychology Department at the University of Otago for one session 
with a duration of approximately forty-five minutes to one hour.   
At this visit:   
• Your child and the researcher will do some tasks together. 
• You will engage in an interaction task with your child. 
• You will be required to fill out a short questionnaire about your child. 
• The session will be video-taped so that the researchers can later analyse 
the tapes.   
 
After the assessment at the Psychology Department you will be thanked for 
your participation with a $20 voucher and your child will receive a small gift. 
You will also be entered into a draw for a $50 grocery voucher. 
Please be aware that you may decide not to take part in the project without 





What Data or Information will be Collected and What Use will be Made of it? 
• We will gather video information about your child’s development which 
we will later analyse 
• We will also ask you to fill out a questionnaire about your child’s empathy 
development as well as describing your child to us.   
• We will assess your child’s language and social development by asking 
them to look at some toys and pictures. 
 
The data will be stored on computer in the Principal Investigator’s lab.  
Access to this information will only be available to the lead researchers, and 
research assistants, who will be responsible for transcribing the data and 
entering the results into a database.  Any student access to the data for 
research projects will be closely monitored by the supervisors (lead 
researchers). 
 
The data collected will be securely stored in such a way that only those 
mentioned above will be able to gain access to it.  At the end of the project 
any personal information will be destroyed immediately except that, as 
required by the University's research policy, any raw data on which the results 
of the project depend will be retained in secure storage for five years, after 
which it will be destroyed. 
The results of the project may be published and will be available in the 
University of Otago Library (Dunedin, New Zealand) but every attempt will be 
made to preserve your anonymity. 
 
Can Participants Change their Mind and Withdraw from the Project? 
You may withdraw from participation in the project at any time and without 
any disadvantage to yourself of any kind. 
 
What if Participants have any Questions? 
If you have any questions about our project, either now or in the future, 
please feel free to contact either: 
Dr Mele Taumoepeau, Department of Psychology, 479 4029, 
mele@psy.otago.ac.nz or Millie Gledhill, Masters student, Department of 
Psychology, 02041004337, childstudy2015@gmail.com  
 
This study has been approved by the University of Otago Human Ethics Committee. If you 
have any concerns about the ethical conduct of the research you may contact the 
Committee through the Human Ethics Committee Administrator (ph 03 479 8256). Any issues 







Parent and Child Consent Forms 
[Reference Number                                     ] 
 
The Foundations of Social Understanding  
CONSENT FORM FOR PARENT/GUARDIAN 
I have read the Information Sheet concerning this project and understand 
what it is about.  All my questions have been answered to my satisfaction.  I 
understand that I am free to request further information at any stage. 
 
I know that: 
 
1. My participation in the project is entirely voluntary 
 
2. I am free to withdraw from the project at any time without any 
disadvantage 
 
3. I will be video-taped 
 
4. Personal identifying information [video-tapes] will be destroyed at the 
conclusion of the project but any raw data on which the results of the 
project depend will be retained in secure storage for at least five years; 
 
5. I will be provided with a $20 voucher after the visit to the Psychology 
Department and I will be entered into a draw to win a $50 grocery voucher 
upon completion of the study; 
 
6. The results of the project may be published and will be available in the 
University of Otago Library (Dunedin, New Zealand) but every attempt will 
be made to preserve my anonymity.  
  
I agree to take part in this project. 
 




This study has been approved by the University of Otago Human Ethics Committee. If you have any 
concerns about the ethical conduct of the research you may contact the Committee through the 
Human Ethics Committee Administrator (ph 03 479 8256). Any issues you raise will be treated in confidence 






The Foundations of Social Understanding  
 
CONSENT  FORM  FOR CHILD 
 
I have read the Information Sheet concerning this project and understand 
what it is about.  All my questions have been answered to my satisfaction.  I 
understand that I am free to request further information at any stage. 
I know that: 
 
1. My child’s participation in the project is entirely voluntary; 
 
2.   My child will be video-taped 
 
3. I am free to withdraw my child from the project at any time without any 
disadvantage 
 
4. Personal identifying information [video-tapes] will be destroyed at the 
conclusion of the project but any raw data on which the results of the 
project depend will be retained in secure storage for at least five years 
 
5. My child will be given a small gift after they visit the Psychology 
Department 
 
6. The results of the project may be published and will be available in the 
University of Otago Library (Dunedin, New Zealand) but every attempt 
will be made to preserve my child’s anonymity.  
 
I agree for my child to take part in this project. 
 
Signature of parent/guardian:…………………………………………………. 
 
Name of child:………………………………………Date:……………………….. 
 
This study has been approved by the University of Otago Human Ethics Committee. If you have any 
concerns about the ethical conduct of the research you may contact the Committee through the 
Human Ethics Committee Administrator (ph 03 479 8256). Any issues you raise will be treated in confidence 







Study Debrief Form for Participants  
The Foundations of Social Understanding 
 
What is Social Understanding?  
Learning about other people’s internal states (e.g., emotions, desires, thoughts) is 
challenging for young children because internal states are ‘inner’ and therefore 
unobservable (i.e., you can’t directly see another person’s thoughts or feelings). In 
order to understand how another person is feeling and thinking, children often have 
to learn use ‘clues’ such as facial expressions and behaviour. Learning to understand 
other people’s internal states is important as it forms the basis of compassion and 
empathy, and allows children to understand and predict other people’s behaviour.  
 
We know from previous research that by the age of four, children do have a 
reasonable understanding of other people’s internal states. Although we know that 
young children do acquire an understanding about other’s internal states during the 
first few years of life, it is still unclear exactly how they acquire this knowledge.  The 
current study aimed to help bring clarity to this issue by assessing parent-child 
interactions and children’s developing social understanding.  
 
The Importance of Parental Input 
Learning theory holds that during the first four years of life children undergo a very 
rapid stage of learning about people’s internal states and that parental input is very 
important for facilitating this learning. In the current study, we assessed parent-child 
conversations in an attempt to discover the types of parental input that is most helpful 
for children’s developing social understanding. We also asked you to complete a 
questionnaire regarding your child’s empathy, and you later described your child. This 
is useful for us, as it helps us to gain a better understanding of your child.  
 
Children’s Developmental Trajectory to Social Understanding 
Learning theory also holds that the type of parental input that is most useful for 
children’s social understanding will be different at different stages of development. 
Physically, children often progress from rolling, to sitting, to crawling, to standing, to 
walking, with each step incrementally building on the previous milestone and with 
parents gently supporting progression. In the same way, we want to discover what 
the ‘social milestones’ are with regards to cognitive insights that allow for a child to 
advance to the next level of social understanding. 
 
Language Measures (The Preschool CELF)  
With any child development study, it is important to take measures of children’s 
language. This helps us to ascertain whether children have the necessary 
vocabulary and comprehension to understand what is being asked of them and to 
provide a verbal response. With our study, language is a particularly important 
measure. Social understanding and language acquisition have a bi-directional 
relationship; better language allows for a better understanding of the social world, 
and, adversely, an understanding of people’s internal states allows for better 
language acquisition.  
 
Theory of Mind Tasks (ToM) 
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Children participated in two ToM tasks where they were asked about a protagonist’s 
mental state behaviour and a contrast question about reality/expression/someone 
else’s state. These two tasks were Contents False-Belief and Change in Location. In 
the Contents False-Belief task, children were shown an unexpected item in a box. 
They were then introduced to a character who had never seen inside the box, and 
asked what they thought the character would think was inside the box. The Change 
in Location task involved the child being told a story about a character who placed 
an item in a drawer and left the room. After this, their mother changed the location 
of the item. The child was asked where they thought the character would think the 
item was. In both ToM tasks, we were investigating whether children understand that 
others’ beliefs are different from their own.  
 
Measures of Social Understanding - Test of Emotion Comprehension (TEC)  
Children were asked a series of questions to assess their level of emotion 
comprehension. The experimenter read stories about fictional characters, after 
which the child was asked to choose which emotional expression best suited the 
character’s situation. The stories and questions became progressively complex, 
starting with questions about basic desires, and ending with questions about mixed 
emotions. We are interested in how the emotion comprehension of children of 
different ages develops over time, and how this relates to parent-child interactions.  
 
Prosocial Behaviour 
Blanket task: During the session, the experimenter expressed “being cold”. She 
wrapped herself in a blanket to indicate that it would make her feel better. Later in 
the session, she expressed being cold again, this time, waiting to see if the child 
would get her the blanket or not. We are interested to see if the children picked up 
on the experimenter’s internal state and whether they demonstrated prosocial 
behaviour. Children typically assist others with goal-based problems before they 
provide aid for a problem involving an internal state. Alleviating another's emotional 
distress is cognitively and emotionally demanding, requiring the helper to interpret 
emotional cues, understand what actions may help, and then override their 
empathic experience of distress to provide the aid they wish to give.   
Prosocial Orientation Story-Completion: This task consists of four illustrated scenarios, 
which describe familiar situations encountered by a child and is followed by a 
question that assesses the respondent’s prosocial orientation. The four items focus on 
specific prosocial behaviours – comforting, peace-making, sharing and helping. In 
this task, we were aiming to see if the child recognised the emotions of others, 
showed empathy towards them, and displayed prosocial intentions.  
 
The Book Reading Task 
This task was used to assess parent-child conversations. That is, we deliberately set up 
a situation that might encourage conversation between parent and child. We know 
that parents are helping to facilitate their child’s developing social understanding, 
but we want to learn from parents by trying to ascertain and identify exactly what 
type of conversational style is most likely to support a child’s understanding of 
mental states at different stages of development.  
Thank you once again for your participation in our study. Understanding parental input 
and children’s incremental social insights will help us to map out a developmental 
trajectory for social understanding during the first few years of life. If we understand 
how ‘normal’ development occurs, we will have a ‘yard stick’ for understanding 
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exactly what goes wrong in cases of atypical development such as autism and other 
developmental disorders.  
 
What if Participants have any Questions? 
If you have any questions about our project, either now or in the future, please feel 
free to contact either: 
Dr Mele Taumoepeau, Department of Psychology, 479 4029, 







Picture Book Task Coding Protocol 
Keyboard Shortcuts for Interact 
Speaker Non MS Content 
0 = parent 2 = other 
1 = toddler 3 = label objects/event 
 4 = link 
 5 = unclear 
 
 
Non-Mental State Content by Referent 
Referring to self (parent) Referring to Child Referring to Other 
b = physical state l = physical state v = physical state 
c = physical state emotion m = physical state emotion w = physical state emotion 
a = visual perception k = visual perception u = visual perception 
Mental State Content by Referent 
d = emotion n = emotion x = emotion 
e = desire genuine o = desire genuine y = desire genuine  
f = desire directive p = desire directive  z = desire directive  
g = think genuine q = think genuine 6 = think genuine 
h = think/know conversational r = think/know conversational 7 = think/know conversational 
i = know s = know 8 = know 




In order to mark the events press the spacebar (the shortcut for ‘start event’) when the 
experimenters leave the room. Press spacebar again at the conclusion of the first utterance 
and then assign the relevant codes (starting with ‘x’ as an event marker). Once codes are 





Begin coding with the file which already has the session partitioned into events. Play each 
event and assign the codes to the blank ‘speaker’, ‘content’ and ‘referent’ class columns.  
Sweep 1: coded for speaker, content, and referent.   
Sweep 2: mental state and visual perception content coded for connectedness. 
N.B. secondary coder may find they can code everything in one sweep. 
 
Repetition 
If a mental state or visual orientation term is repeated within an utterance, code only the 
first occurrence of that term. 
Examples: 
Teddy is happy, so happy. 
Look (name), look what’s in here. 
Clarification:  
Double use of a word/utterance is not classified as a repeat if there is a pause of 2 seconds 
or more, or the other person has a ‘turn’ (verbalisation or action) between the first and 
second use of the word. 
Repetition may be used if encourages interaction (e.g. ‘Ooh look a puppy’, ‘Ooh puppy’, ‘Do 
you like that puppy?’, ‘Cute puppy’) 
 
Trumping rules 
Mental state and visual orientation terms trump non mental state terms, therefore, if an 
utterance contains any mention of mental/internal states or visual orientation words it is 
coded as such. 
Clarifications: 
1. If an utterance contains more than one mental state term, then two codes are 
assigned to that utterance.   
- For example, parent: “(name) look, what do you think is in here?” (refers to 
child’s visual orientation and thoughts, so would code it as ‘child visual 
perception’ AND ‘child think genuine’)  
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- Or, parent: “Do you think the teddy wants some too?” (refers to child’s 
thoughts and other’s desires, so would code as ‘child think genuine’ and 
‘other desire genuine’) 
2. Mental state content trumps non mental state content (i.e., if the parent labels and 
uses visual perception, then only code visual perception) 
3. ‘Label objects/event’ trumps ‘other’ non mental state content (i.e., if the parent 




p = parent is speaker. All parental utterances are coded. 
t = toddler (child) is speaker. Child’s utterances are only coded if they are clear or the parent 
immediately repeats it. ‘Mama/Dada’ and variations thereof are only coded if clearly 
referring to the child’s mother/father (i.e., direct address that parent responds to or clear 
reference to the absent parent). Child repetitions of parent utterance are not coded.        
                                                                                                                                       
NON-MENTAL STATE CONTENT 
2 = Other 
Utterances which do not refer to mental or internal states  
Examples: 
- When the parents praises the child (e.g., “good boy/girl” 
- Yes/no responses (e.g., “yes that’s right”, “no don’t touch that”) 
- “Wow” 
- “Awww” 
- Animal noises 
 
3 = Label Objects / Events 
A short word or phrase labelling an object or person, or describing an event. 
Not included if delivered in question form. 
Examples: 




- “There’s some water” 
- “The cat’s in the shopping trolley” 
- “The girl’s got a hat on” 
- “The cat is running” 
 
4 = Links to child’s life 
When the primary caregiver connects the pictorial information to their child’s life 
Examples: 
- “We did that when we went to the beach” 
- “We have milk in our porridge” 
- “You had an injection last week” 
 
5 = Unclear 
After listening 3 times, utterance or behaviour is unintelligible or its content is otherwise 
unclear. 
Includes ‘mmm’, ‘hmm’, ‘um’ ‘eh’, ‘huh’, ‘pardon’, laughter, and other noise effects. 
 
Physical States 
b = referring to self (the parent) 
l = referring to the child 
v = referring to someone other than the parent or child (E.g., the teddy bear) 
Description: 
Utterances which refer to internal physical states. 
Examples:   
Sick, ill, in pain, sore, sleepy, tired, hungry, thirsty, better (in the sense of being 
well/healthy), brave 
Clarifications: 
1. Verbs such as running, sleeping, etc are not included 
 
Physical state emotions 
c = referring to self (the parent) 
m = referring to the child 
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w = referring to someone other than the parent or child (E.g., the teddy bear) 
Description: 
Utterances which refer to physical states that represent a clear underlying emotion.  
Examples:   
Cry, smile, laugh, giggle  
Clarifications: 
1. Includes all forms/variations, for example, crying, cries, etc. 
 
Visual perception 
a = referring to self (the parent) 
k = referring to the child 
u = referring to someone other than the parent or child (e.g., the teddy bear) 
Description: 
Utterances which refer to looking or seeing. These can be:  
Questions – e.g. “What can you see in the box?” 
Imperatives – e.g. “Look at what she is doing with the teddy.” 
Statements – e.g. “He’s looking in his lunchbox.” 
Clarifications: 
1. This code does not apply to the use of ‘see’ as a proxy for ‘find out’ (e.g. “let’s see” 
or  
2. ‘shall we see what’s on the next page”), or for the use of ‘looks’ as a proxy for 
‘appears’ (e.g. “It looks like a cracker”).  
3. The word “look” without a stated referent implies the child is the referent. 
 
MENTAL STATE CONTENT 
Emotion 
d = referring to self (the parent) 
n = referring to the child 
x = referring to someone other than the parent or child (E.g., the teddy bear) 
Description: 
Utterances that contain references to emotions/feelings 
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Examples:   
Happy, pleased, sad, hurt (not physical hurt, emotional), fear, scared, afraid, disgust, 
surprise, fright, angry, growly, grumpy, cross, mad, not pleased, not happy, unhappy, doesn’t 
look happy, feel good, feel bad, disappointed, worried, upset, enjoy, excited, interested, 
frustrated, missed, annoyed, hurtful, bored, fed up 
 
Desire genuine 
e = referring to self (the parent) 
o = referring to the child 
y = referring to someone other than the parent or child (e.g., the teddy bear) 
Description: 
• Utterances that contain references to desires. (i.e., does the mother realise that the 
child desires to sit down? If her utterance reflects then the mother is referring to the 
child’s desires). 
• In this case the context needs to be examined so that it can be seen whether the 
mother is correctly judging the child’s desires/emotions, which will be evidenced 
through the child’s behaviour/utterances. 
Examples:   
Want, like, love, hope, wish, dream, prefer, keen on, hate 
 
Desire directive  
     f = referring to self (parent) 
     p = referring to the child 
     z = referring to someone other than the parent or child (e.g., the teddy bear) 
Description: 
Utterances that are not directed as a true reflection of how the child feels. The mother may 
refer to a mental state as a way of softening a request (e.g. instead of saying ‘you need to do 
this’ the mother could say ‘I think we need to do this’ to soften the request). E.g. “Do you 





g = referring to self (the parent) 
q = referring to the child 
6 = referring to someone other than the parent or child (E.g., the teddy bear) 
Description: 
These are genuine references to thinking (as opposed to conversational, which do not 
reflect on an awareness of or reference to a person’s thoughts). 
Examples:   
Think as a mental activity (e.g. “They’re thinking hard.”) 
Think as referring to beliefs (e.g. “Why do you think that?”) 
 
Think/know conversational 
      h = referring to self (the parent) 
      r = referring to the child 
      7 = referring to someone other than the parent or child (e.g., the teddy bear) 
Description:Utterances that are not references to the mental state of thinking, and when 
the parent refers to knowing something in a conversational context (this meaning it does 
not reflect on an awareness of or reference to a person’s actual knowledge) 
 
1. Conversational use of ‘think’ (turn-taking element) 
Examples:   
- Directing attention within the conversation (not a genuine request for the child 
to share their thoughts, e.g., “I think I’m going to play with this now”) 
- Relinquishing the conversational turn (e.g., “What do you think of that?”) 
- Softening a command/request or reprimand (e.g., “I think we need to tidy up”)  
- Yes or no extensions (e.g., “I think so”) 
Clarifications: 
1. Conversational use of ‘know’ 
Examples:   
- Directing attention within the conversation (e.g., “You know what?”) 
- Relinquishing the conversational turn (e.g., “You know, you should tell me”) 




- Yes or no extensions (e.g., “I know, she went out the door.”)  
- “I don’t know” on its own. 
-  “I know, there’s lights and a heater” 
 
2. Use of ‘know’ as a proxy for ‘familiar with’ IS included in this code (e.g. “We know 
this picture, it’s a Mummy breastfeeding.”)  
 
Know genuine 
i = referring to self (the parent) 
s = referring to the child 
8 = referring to someone other than the parent or child (e.g., the teddy bear) 
Description: 
These are genuine references to knowledge. 
Examples:   
Know as lack of knowledge (e.g., “I don’t know what that is”) 
Know as questioning the source of knowledge (e.g., “How do you know that?”) 
Know as ability (e.g., “You know how to tie your shoelaces”) 
“do you know what that is?” 
 
Other cognitive states 
j = referring to self (the parent) 
t = referring to the child 
9 = referring to someone other than the parent or child (E.g., the teddy bear) 
Examples:   
Remember, understand, forget, remind, realize, idea, consider, have in mind, daydream, 
dream (when asleep), mean, imagine, pretend (not as adjective), wonder, clever, expect 
(NOT “I expect so” in response to a question).  
1. Includes Modulation of Assertion 
Examples:   
Definitely, maybe, perhaps, possibly, probably, could, might, maybe, perhaps, 




o When used as a synonym for ‘think’, modulations of assertion are included 
under the ‘think’ code. For example: sure, guess, reckon, certain, suppose, 
wonder, expect, bet 
Examples: 
“I suppose he’s getting ready for bed.” -- ‘suppose’ used as a 
synonym for ‘think’ 
“She’s sure she’s going to get a treat.” -- ‘sure’ used as a synonym 






UCLA Self Understanding Questionnaire 
Self-description and Evaluation      CODE         TIME      2       3       4         5 
 
Does _________________ever use general evaluative terms about himself or herself (e.g., 
"I'm a good girl,") (Susie's pretty")? 
Definitely not  sort of  definitely  
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Does ____________ever resist your help by saying "do it myself," "Cindy do it or the 
equivalent? 
Definitely not  sort of  definitely  
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Does _______________ever use general evaluative terms when talking about someone 
(e.g.," bad dog, Johnny’s bad or mean"X 
Definitely not  sort of  definitely  
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Does  _________________ ever say "l can’t?” 
Definitely not  sort of  definitely  
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Does _______________ever use descriptive terms that contain some evaluation (e.g" 
"sticky hands," point to toys and say "dirty" or 'broken")? 
Definitely not  sort of  definitely  
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Does ________________ever use his/her own name (e.g, "Give it to Andrew," 'Andrew 
truck")? 
Definitely not  sort of  definitely  
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Does _____________ ever insist on wearing certain clothing? 
Definitely  not  sort of  definitely  
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Does __________________ use the word me? 
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Definitely not  sort of  definitely  
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Does _______________ use the word “mine”? 
Definitely not  sort of  definitely  
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Does _______________ know whether she/he is a girl or boy? 
Definitely not  sort of  definitely 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Does ______________ ever use the word “I"? 
Definitely not  sort of  definitely  
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Does _________________ describe himself/herself by physical characteristics (e.g" curly 
hair” 
Definitely not  sort of  definitely  
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Self-Recognition 
Does ______________ recognize himself/herself in the mirror (identify himself/herself by 
name; point to mirror when you say where is _____ ?')? 
Definitely not  sort of  definitely  
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Does _________________ ever call attention to something about himself/herself like hair or 
clothing? 
Definitely not  sort of  definitely  
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Does ________________ communicate likes and dislikes verbally? 
Definitely not  sort of  definitely  
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Does _____________________ recognize himself/herself in pictures? 
Definitely not  sort of  definitely  
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Does _____________ ever call attention to something he/she did (e.g., "Look what I did," or 
by gesture-showing you something she/he did? 
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Definitely not  sort of  definitely  
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Emotional Response to Wrongdoing and Self-Regulation 
Does your child ever seem upset when calling your attention to something he/she 
has done wrong?  
Yes    No 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Does your child ever seem upset (ashamed, remorseful) when you find him/her doing 
something he/she shouldn't do and you show your disapproval?  
Yes    No 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Has he/she ever tried to hide the evidence of something he/she did that he/she 
wasn't supposed to do?  
Yes    No 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Has he/she ever called your attention to something he/she did that he/she wasn't 
supposed to do (e.g.," pulled the TV knob off)?  
Yes    No 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Has your child ever inhibited himself/herself from doing something be/she 
obviously wanted to do because you were watching?  
Yes    No 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Autonomy 
Does __________________ ever assert his/her own will contrary to yours, just for the sake 
of being contrary? 
Definitely not  sort of  definitely  
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Does _____________________ ever resist physical intervention (e.g.; diapering, dressing, 
kissing, picking up X? 




Does _____________________ ever resist your help by pushing your hand away or saying 
"no"? 








Emotion Questionnaire (EmQue) 
The following statements are about your child’s behaviour over the last 2 months. Please 
answer them to the best of your ability, even if the behaviour mentioned in the statement 
does not seem to apply to your child. Please do no skip any questions!  
Please choose between the following alternative: 
• Not applicable (as far as you are aware of) 
• A little or sometimes applicable 
• Clearly or often applicable 
 No  Sometimes Often 
1. When another child cries, my child gets upset too.    
2. When I make clear that I want some peace and quiet, my 
child tries not to bother me.  
   
3. When my child sees other children laughing, he/she starts 
laughing too. 
   
4. My child also needs to be comforted when another child is 
in pain. 
   
5. When another child starts to cry, my child tries to comfort 
him/her.  
   
6. When an adult gets angry with another child, my child 
watches attentively.  
   
7. When another child makes a bad fall, shortly after my child 
pretends to fall too.  
   
8. When another child gets upset, my child tries to cheer 
him/her up.  
   
9. My child looks up when another child laughs.    
10. When another child is upset, my child needs to be 
comforted too.  
   
11. When I make it clear that I want to do something by myself 
(e.g. read), my child leaves me alone for a while. 
   
12. When adults laugh, my child tries to get near them.    
13. When another child gets frightened, my child freezes or 
starts to cry.  
   
14. When two children are quarrelling, my child tries to stop 
them.  
   
15. My child looks up when another child cries.     
16. When other children argue, my child gets upset.     
17. When another child gets frightened, my child tries to help 
him/her.  
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18. When another child is angry, my child stops his/her own 
play to watch.  
   
19. When another child cries, my child looks away.    
20. When other children quarrel, my child wants to see what is 
going on.  






Prosocial Story Task Stories (Female Versions)  
I’m going to read you some very short stories. Would you like to help me find an ending for 
them? The stories are about this little girl whose name is Lucy. Lucy is a little girl of about 
4/5 years old, like you. I am going to read the start of a story, and then read three different 
endings, you tell me which one you think will happen. 
Story 1: Lucy is going to school with Georgie. Georgie is crying because she tripped on a 
stone and fell down and hurt herself. What do you think will happen next?  
a. Lucy goes to play with her friends 
 
b. Lucy sees that Georgie is crying 
 
c. Lucy gets Georgie a plaster 
 
Story 2: Lucy is at the playground with Anna and Sophie. There is only one swing and both 
Anna and Sophie want to go on it. Lucy sees them begin to argue. What do you think will 
happen next?  
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a. Lucy says they should take turns on the swing 
 
b. Lucy starts to fight too because she wants to go on the swing as well 
 
c. The teacher comes and makes the girls stop arguing 
 
Story 3: Lucy is in the schoolyard with her classmates. Lucy sees Mandy snatch the ball from 
Julia. Julia starts to cry. What do you think will happen next? 
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a. Lucy gives Julia a hug 
 
b. Lucy leaves and plays with her other friends 
 
c. Lucy takes the ball from Mandy 
 
Story 4: Lucy sees that Andy does not know how to draw a car. Lucy is very good at drawing 
because her dad taught her. What do you think will happen next?  
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a. Lucy will feel bad for Andy because he can’t draw 
 
b. Lucy will help Andy draw the car 
 
c. Lucy will tell Andy that he is bad at drawing 
 
 
